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Richard Jackson Richard Jackson is Lecturer in International Politics at The University of Manchester. His recent book Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism examines the public language of the war on terrorism, and the way that rhetoric has been deployed to justify and normalise a global counter-terrorist campaign. It explains how the political and cultural meaning of 9-11 came to be dominated by a single war-based interpretation; how the abuse of prisoners in Iraq was normalised through language and practice; and how officials deliberately manipulate public anxiety about terrorist threats. ‘It
does not matter whether the war is actually happening, and, since no
decisive victory is possible, it does not matter whether the war is
going well or badly. All
that is needed is that a state of war should exist.’ George
Orwell, 1984 The
‘war on terrorism’ is both a set of institutional practices
(military and intelligence operations, diplomatic initiatives, special
government departments and security bodies, standard operating
procedures), as well as an accompanying discursive project. That is,
it is simultaneously a limited range of possible statements which promote a limited range of
meaning[2];
or, a special political language of
counter-terrorism with its own assumptions, symbolic system,
rhetorical modes and tropes, metaphors, narratives and
meanings, and its own exclusive forms of knowledge. While studies on
the practice of There are both ontological and normative reasons why a critical analysis of the discourse of the ‘war on terrorism’ is urgently called for. Ontologically, as a number of important works have reminded us,[5] political reality is a social construct, manufactured through discursive practices and shared systems of meaning. Language does not simply reflect reality, it actually co-constitutes it. As a consequence, a fully informed understanding of the current global ‘war on terrorism’ is unattainable in the absence of a critical deconstruction of the official language of counter-terrorism. From
a normative viewpoint, the
enactment of any large-scale project of political violence—such as
war or counter-terrorism—requires a significant degree of political
and social consensus and consensus is not possible without language.
The process of inducing consent—of normalising the practice of
counter-terrorist war—requires more than just propaganda or
so-called ‘public diplomacy’; it actually requires the
construction of a whole new language, or a kind of public narrative,
that manufactures approval while simultaneously suppressing individual
doubts and wider political protest. To put it another way, power is a
social phenomenon and constantly needs to be legitimated; language is
the medium of legitimation.[6]
Thus, the deployment of language by politicians is an exercise of
power and without rigorous public interrogation and critical
examination, unchecked power inevitably becomes abusive. This is never
truer than during times of national crisis when the authorities assume
enhanced powers to deal with perceived threats. Academics that live
within a relatively open society have a normative responsibility to
act as constructive critics and to challenge the lies and obfuscations
of government; this is critical for the strengthening of civil
society.[7]
Alarmingly, the abuse of state power under the banner of the ‘war on
terrorism’ is already well advanced—from the unconstitutional
powers to try ‘enemy combatants’ in secret trials to the
manipulation of intelligence information about Iraq and the
unconstitutional violation of civil liberties in America, Britain and
elsewhere. The systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi
prisoners first exposed in April 2004 is a direct consequence of the
language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of
terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless
enemies of freedom’ (and with hoods on they really are faceless)
creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated.
There is therefore, an ethical duty to cross examine and scrutinise
the language of political leaders, to challenge what they say, rather
than just passively and uncritically absorb it or reproduce it in
academic discourse. This paper is divided into three parts. In the initial section, the
methodological parameters of applying a critical analysis to political
language are discussed. The second section then applies a critical
discourse analysis to aspects of the official language of the ‘war
on terrorism’, focusing primarily on the ways in which identity and
the threat of terrorism are discursively constructed. The final
section reflects on some of the ethical and normative issues
confronting societies in the midst of a massive counter-terrorist
campaign. The overall argument is simple: as responsible academics and
concerned citizens, we have an ethical duty to challenge and resist
the official language of counter-terrorism because it is an abusive
exercise of hegemonic power. Critical discourse analysis provides a
useful methodological approach for such a task. Language and Politics: Why Words Matter How does language co-constitute reality? Why are words so important to
political analysis? The answer can be simply stated: language is never
neutral; words don’t just describe the world, they actually help to
make it. As such, language can never be employed in a purely objective
sense. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, as linguists and anthropologists have discovered, all
language has a basic binary structure such that almost every noun,
adjective and verb has its direct opposite. It is a feature of the
underlying architecture of language. Critically, this opposition
between terms usually implies a ‘devaluation of one term and a
favoring of the other.’[8]
The natural inequality where one term is lacking something the
opposite embodies is rarely questioned or challenged. Some of the
well-known examples of the way the binary system works include:
good/evil, love/hate, new/old, normal/deviant, primitive/modern,
native/foreigner, and west/east. Speaking about ‘civilisation’ for
example (as in ‘terrorism threatens our civilisation’), is
impossible without bringing to mind the concept of ‘barbarism’ as
its negative opposite. Second, language plays an active role in creating and changing
perceptions, cognition and emotions. As something particularly human,
language moulds how we see the world; it is the main determinant of
our perceptions and our access to concrete reality. From knowing the
difference between an apple and a hand grenade, to knowing what to do
with each in relevant situations, language shapes our understanding of
the world around us.[9]
More than affecting perceptions, language also structures
cognition—it affects the way we think, and particularly how we make
strategic choices. By using a restricted set of words and word
formations, some choices can appear perfectly reasonable and
commonsensical while others appear absurd. Expressed another way, the
language we use at any given moment privileges one viewpoint over
others, naturalising some understandings as rational and others as
nonsensical.[10]
As a consequence, language also affects our emotions. It is in an
important sense, the place where our psychic and social lives
intersect. Certain words or combinations of words can make us feel
anxious, fearful, angry or joyful. This generates immense power for
those that deploy them. Politicians, propagandists and advertisers
have known this for a long time, and in fact, we see it almost every
day in people’s reactions to the use of certain words in the media,
such as ‘paedophile’, ‘AIDS’, ‘humanitarian disaster’,
‘murder’, ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and ‘terrorist’. A third reason why words cannot be considered neutral is because words
have histories. In themselves, words have no inherent meaning; rather,
they have to acquire meaning in their own discursive setting.[11]
The process by which words obtain meaning is often lengthy and takes
place through repetition and their careful and selective use in
specific contexts. For example, the use of the terms ‘civilised’
and ‘barbarous’ cannot avoid invoking the history of these words
as they were applied by Christian Europe in the Middle Ages, and by
imperialists and colonists in the nineteenth century. There is a
history to their meaning that affects their usage in a contemporary
context. In other cases, words can take on new meanings through
specific forms of usage.[12]
Because words have histories, the act of naming things is always a
highly charged process that can have serious political and social
consequences. This effect of naming is especially powerful in terms of
political violence because, for example, to ‘call an act of
political violence terrorist is not merely to describe it but to judge
it.’[13]
Consider the difference between calling the killing of an abortion
doctor ‘a murder’ and calling it ‘an act of terrorism’; the
two names for the same act have very contrasting meanings and would
likely elicit very different responses from both the public and the
authorities. The methodological approach I have employed to examine the official
language of the ‘war on terrorism’ is known broadly as critical
discourse analysis. This approach is at once both a technique for
analysing specific texts or speech acts, and a way of understanding
the relationship between discourse and social and political phenomena.
By engaging in concrete, linguistic textual analysis—that is, by
doing systematic analyses of spoken and written language—critical
discourse analysis aims to shed light on the links between texts and
societal practices and structures, or, the linguistic-discursive
dimension of social action.[14]
The approach is based on a number of crucial assumptions. It assumes that
discourse is a form of social practice which both makes or constitutes
the social world, and is at the same time constituted by other social
practices. Discourses both contribute to the shaping of social
structures and are also shaped by them; there is a dialectical
relationship between the two. Of even greater import, critical
discourse analysis assumes that discursive practices are never
neutral, but rather they contribute to the creation and reproduction
of unequal power relations between social groups. That is, discourses
possess a clear ideological character; they are the
construction and deployment of ‘meaning in the service of power.’[15]
Or, more specifically, discourses act as
constructions of meaning that contribute to the production,
reproduction and transformation of relations of domination in society.[16]
Thus, a central aim of
critical discourse analysis lies in revealing the means by which
language is deployed to maintain power. What makes critical discourse
analysis ‘critical’ is its normative commitment to positive social
change. In terms of studying the role and use of language, there are two levels
at which critical discourse analysis functions. First, it engages
directly with specific texts in an effort to discover how discursive
practices operate linguistically within those texts. Second, because
individual text analysis is not sufficient on its own to shed light on
the relationship between discourse and social processes, critical
discourse analysis adds a wider interdisciplinary perspective which
combines textual and social analysis.[17]
In essence, critical discourse analysis involves carefully reading a
specific text—such as a speech, interview, radio address or
report—and employing a series of analytical questions: What
assumptions, beliefs and values underlie the language in the text? How
does the grammar, syntax and sentence construction reinforce the
meanings and effects of the discursive constructions contained in the
text? What are the histories and embedded meanings of the important
words in the text? What patterns can be observed in the language, and
how do different parts of the text relate to each other? What
knowledge or practices are normalised by the language in the text? How
does the language create, reinforce or challenge power relations in
society? Finding answers to these questions goes some way towards
understanding how discourses work to construct social processes and
structures in ways that reproduce power relations. In my analysis of the language of the ‘war on terrorism’ I chose to
focus mainly on the speeches, interviews and public addresses given by
senior members of the Bush administration.[18]
I examined over 100 speeches, interviews, radio broadcasts and reports
to Congress between September 11, 2001 and January 31, 2004; these
texts were a representative sample of more than 6,000 such texts on
the subject of America’s ‘war on terrorism’ for that period. I
began by examining all the important speeches that garnered major
public attention or were of great symbolic importance, such as the
September 11 and Writing
the War on Terrorism The discourse of the ‘war on terrorism’ comprises a vast corpus of texts (speeches, laws, reports, policy documents, operating manuals, memos, letters, emails, and websites— among others), and draws on a great many assumptions, beliefs, myths, tropes and narratives. It also employs a variety of rhetorical and discursive strategies. John Murphy argues that President Bush, for example, almost solely employed an epideictic rhetorical mode in his ‘war on terrorism’ texts. That is, Bush’s epideictic rhetoric ‘shapes the world that provides the backdrop of values and beliefs, heroes and villains, triumphs and tragedies against which and through which deliberative and forensic judgments are made in a ceaseless swirl of discourse.’[19] In keeping with this primary genre, the discourse relies on a powerful mix of analogy (‘Al Qaeda is to terrorism what the mafia is to crime’), amplification (Al Qaeda wanted to ‘kill all Americans’), use of visual imagery (Bush carrying the ‘police shield of a man named George Howard who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others’), popular entertainment tropes (the ‘American hero’), foundational meta-narratives (Pearl Harbor and World War II, the fight for Civilization), and a ubiquitous over-arching Manichean frame (good versus evil, ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’). The following critical discourse analysis can only provide a brief survey of some of the ways in which the official language of the ‘war on terrorism’ seeks to normalize and institutionalize the Bush administration’s counter-terrorism policies; a more in-depth treatment of the discourse can be found elsewhere.[20] Specifically, I focus on the ways in which the language of Administration officials attempts to construct identity and the nature of the terrorist threat. For the sake of clarity, some words in the texts of official speeches have been highlighted to indicate the basis of claims and analyses. Writing
Identities: Evil Terrorists and Good Americans The realm of foreign policy, and particularly foreign adversaries, is enormously significant for ‘writing’ identities.[21] Foreign policy is critical for maintaining internal/external boundaries, and war (as a special form of foreign policy) plays a central role in maintaining the domains of inside/outside, foreign/domestic, self/other. This is no less true for the ‘war on terrorism’, which is constructed largely in an epideictic rhetorical mode, rather than a deliberative mode.[22] Bush makes appeals that attempt to unify the community and amplify its virtues; national character rather than national deliberation determine its actions. In fact, it has been argued that the very concept of the political itself is based on the identification of the ‘enemy’; in other words, the enemy terrorist in the ‘war on terrorism’ acts as the ‘enabling other’ of the state—its negative justification.[23] More than just identity maintenance then, the discourse of self and other in the rhetoric of counter-terrorism co-constitutes the political; it permits the state as practice. Perhaps the most important feature of the construction of identity in this discourse is the ubiquitous use of a rhetorical trope of ‘good and evil’. Deeply embedded in American rhetorical traditions and religious life (as well as being a sub-plot of the ‘civilization-barbarism’ meta-narrative that the administration is so fond of), this language essentializes the terrorists as both satanic and morally corrupt. On September 11, Bush stated that ‘Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature’;[24] in subsequent texts, he frequently refers to terrorists as ‘the evil ones’, and ‘evildoers’. These are theological terms, deployed largely for a Southern conservative audience, but also appealing to popular entertainment understandings of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’. As such, it is a demonological move in which the terrorists are individually and collectively marked as ‘cruel’, ‘mad’ and driven by ‘hate’; perhaps inadvertently, it also supernaturalizes them. In this agent/act ratio, the character of the terrorists precedes their actions: the terrorists did what they did because it is in their nature to do so—they murdered because that is what evil, demonic terrorists do.[25] It is a powerful discourse, and an act of demagoguery, which de-contextualizes and de-historicizes the actions of the terrorists, emptying them of any political content, while simultaneously de-humanizing them. After all, there can be no deeper explanation for such acts, and there can be no reasoning or compromising with evil; the only right response is exorcism and purification. At the same time, the radical evil argument[26] is a long used strategy of silencing liberal dissent: from Leo Strauss and Reinhold Neibuhr to Ronald Reagan, liberals have been charged with lacking both a realistic sense of human evil and the moral courage to confront it. In an extension of re-making the attackers as demons, they are also scripted as inhuman or non-human. Bush speaks of the ‘curse of terrorism that is upon the face of the earth’,[27] while Colin Powell refers to ‘the scourge of terrorism’.[28] This medical metaphor is restated more explicitly by Rumsfeld: ‘We share the belief that terrorism is a cancer on the human condition’.[29] Bush in turn, speaks of the danger to the body politic posed by ‘terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own’.[30] In this construction, the terrorist is re-made as a dangerous organism that makes its host ill; they hide interiorly, drawing on the lifeblood of their unsuspecting hosts and spreading poison. This particular language is actually a precursor to the disciplinary idea of ‘the enemy within’; they are the new ‘reds under the bed’. Of course, such ‘an evil and inhuman group of men’[31]—these ‘faceless enemies of human dignity’[32]—are undeserving of our sympathy or protection. While it would be wrong to treat an enemy soldier inhumanely, or torture a criminal suspect, the same cannot be said for a parasite, a cancer, a curse. If the enemy is removed from the moral realm of human community, then by extension, actions towards them cannot be judged on moral terms. This is extremely liberating for a government fighting a hidden enemy, as it means that those government agencies that practice the ‘black arts’ can be unleashed with impunity. However, as if it were not enough to strip the enemy of all human features, the discourse also goes on to write them as fundamentally ‘alien’ and ‘foreign’. As John Ashcroft states: Today
I'm announcing several steps that we're taking to enhance our ability
to protect the This
designation of ‘alien terrorists’ in particular, is the ultimate
expression of ‘otherness’ and is designed to clearly demarcate the
boundaries between the inside and the outside, between those who
belong to the community and those outside of it. In other words, not
only are the terrorists disqualified from the domain of our community,
they are disqualified from humanity itself. In a society immersed in
the movie mythology of Invasion of the Body Snatchers, Alien,
Independence Day, and The X-Files, the meanings of the
term ‘alien terrorist’ oscillate between ‘extra-terrestrial
parasite’ and ‘foreign enemy’ without a hint of irony. After
all, alien invasion movies are simply metaphors for the fear of
foreign invasion. Anthropologically, the trope of the
evil/cancerous/alien terrorist ‘monster’—the mode of composing
social relations among terms—is actually the cultural projection of
the tabooed ‘wild man’ figure of the Western imagination.[34]
That is, rooted in the fundamental need to control dangerous behavior,
taboos function to locate, identify and segregate transgressions and
dangers. In the absence of the (old) barbarians and the ‘red
menace’, terrorism now fulfills these functions to a tee. On
the other side of the identity coin, Americans are simultaneously
constructed as being the polar opposite of the terrorist nature. The
first major discursive inscription of the American character comes
early on at the Prayer and Remembrance Day service on In
this trial, we have been reminded, and the world has seen, that our
fellow Americans are generous and kind, resourceful
and brave. We see our national character in rescuers working
past exhaustion; in long lines of blood donors; in thousands of
citizens who have asked to work and serve in any way possible. And we
have seen our national character in eloquent acts of sacrifice.
[…] In these acts, and in many others, Americans showed a deep
commitment to one another, and an abiding love for our country.
Today, we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage of
national unity. This is a unity of every faith, and every
background.[35] Bush is constructing a new world of clearly demarcated characters: where terrorists are cruel, ‘the American people’ are generous and kind; where terrorists are hateful, Americans are loving; where terrorists are cowardly, Americans are brave and heroic; and where terrorists hide and run, Americans are united. This highlighting and amplification is necessary to inscribe the essential qualities of insiders and outsiders, and plays through a movie-based mode of the simple opposites of ‘good guys and bad guys’. Another ubiquitous motif in the discourse is the ‘hero’ narrative,
which again, is modelled on popular entertainment scripts. Every story
in American popular culture has a cast of heroes and villains. The
‘war on terrorism’ is no different: every We
remember them as heroes. And we are right to do so. […] ‘He
was a hero long before the eleventh of September,’ said a
friend of one of those we have lost—‘a hero every single
day, a hero to his family, to his friends and to his
professional peers.’ […] About him and those who served with him,
his wife said: ‘It's not just when a plane hits their building. They
are heroes every day.’ ‘Heroes every day.’ We are
here to affirm that.[36]
In
one sense, this could be seen simply national therapy—a way of
giving meaning and respect to the lives lost. However, in its
discursive function, it is also the inscription of the heroic
Americans who are the opposite of the cowardly terrorists; it is the
rendering of In summary, destroying the face of the terrorist, removing all traces of their personality or humanity, is essential to constructing the massive counter-violence of the ‘war on terrorism’. After all, it would be far more difficult to bomb, torture, or hold in prison camps ‘enemy combatants’ that were simply misguided, or psychologically ill, or commonly criminal. Simultaneously, the scripting of Americans as essentially ‘good’ (and heroic, peaceful, innocent) is a means of reassurance: whatever Americans do is good and right, because it is their nature to be good—even if on the face of it, the victims of September 11, 2001 look strikingly similar to the victims of October 7, 2001. Writing
Threat and Danger Another
ubiquitous feature of the discourse of the ‘war on terrorism’ is
the scripting of a perpetual state of threat and danger. As David
Campbell has eloquently shown, discourses of danger and foreign threat
have been integral in constituting and disciplining American identity
as practiced through its foreign policy.[37]
Collectivities, especially those as disparate and diverse as Of
course, there are other more mundane political functions for
constructing fear and moral panic: provoking and allaying anxiety to
maintain quiescence, de-legitimizing dissent, elevating the status of
security actors, diverting scarce resources into ideologically driven
political projects, and distracting the public from more complex and
pressing social ills.[38]
This is not to say that terrorism poses no real threat; the dangers
can plainly be seen in the images of falling bodies and the piles of
rubble at ‘Ground Zero’. Rather, it is to point out that dangers
are those facets of social life interpreted as threats (in one
sense, dangers do not exist objectively, independent of perception),
and what is interpreted as posing a threat may not always correspond
to the realities of the actual risk of harm. Illegal narcotics, for
example, pose less of a risk than the abuse of legal drugs, but a
‘war on drugs’ makes it otherwise. Similarly, the ‘war on
terrorism’ is a multi-billion dollar exercise to protect Americans
from a danger that, excluding the September 11, 2001 attacks, killed
less people per year over several decades than bee stings and
lightening strikes. Even in 2001, The
initial construction of the threat of terrorism involved fixing the
attacks of 9/11 as the start of a whole new ‘age of terror’,
rather than as an extraordinary event, or an aberration (out of 18,000
terrorist attacks since 1968 only a dozen or so have caused more than
100 deaths; high-casualty terrorist attacks are extremely rare and
9/11 was the rarest of the rare). Instead, the attacks were
interpreted as the dawning of a new era of terrorist violence that
knew no bounds. As Bush stated, ‘All
of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a
different world’.[40]
Vice-President Dick Cheney made it even clearer: Today,
we are not just looking at a new era in national security policy,
we are actually living through it. The exact nature of the new
dangers revealed themselves on This
construct was only possible by severing all links between this act of
terrorism and countless others that had preceded it, and by
de-contextualizing it from the history of al Qaeda’s previous
attacks. In effect, the events of ‘9/11’ were constructed without
a pre-history; they stand alone as a defining day of cruelty and evil
(‘infamy’). This break with the past makes it possible to assign
it future significance as the start of ‘super-terrorism’,
‘catastrophic terrorism’, or simply ‘the new terrorism’.
Logically, if there’s a new super-terrorism, then a new
super-war-on-terrorism seems reasonable. A
second feature of this discourse of danger is the hyperbolic language
of threat. It is not just a threat of sudden violent death, it is
actually a ‘threat to civilization’, a ‘threat to the very
essence of what you do’,[42]
a ‘threat to our
way of life’,[43]
and a threat to ‘the peace of the
world’.[44]
The notion of a ‘threat to our way of life’ is a Cold War
expression that vastly inflates the danger: instead of a tiny group of
dissidents with resources that do not even begin to rival that of the
smallest states, it implies that they are as powerful as the Soviet
empire was once thought to be with its tens of thousands of missiles
and its massive conventional army. Moreover, as Cheney reminds us, the
threat of terrorism, like the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons, is
supremely catastrophic: The
attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the possibility
that the next time terrorists strike, they may well be armed with more
than just plane tickets and box cutters. The next time they might
direct chemical agents or diseases at our population, or attempt to
detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities. […] no rational
person can doubt that terrorists would use such weapons of mass
murder the moment they are able to do so. […] we are dealing with
terrorists […] who are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order
to kill millions of others.[45]
In
other words, not only are we threatened by evil terrorists eager to
kill millions (not to mention civilization itself, the peace of the
world, and the American way of life), but this is a rational and
reasonable fear to have. We should be afraid, very afraid: ‘If they
had the capability to kill millions of innocent
civilians, do any of us believe they would hesitate to do so?’.[46]
As if
this was not enough to spread panic throughout the community,
officials then go to great lengths to explain how these same
terrorists (who are eager to kill millions of us) are actually highly
sophisticated, cunning, and extremely dangerous. As John Ashcroft put
it: ‘The highly coordinated attacks of September 11 make it clear
that terrorism is the activity of expertly organized, highly
coordinated and well financed organizations and
networks’.[47]
Moreover, this is not a tiny and isolated group of dissidents, but
‘there are thousands of these terrorists in more than
60 countries’ and they ‘hide in countries around the world to plot
evil and destruction’;[48]
or, like the plot of a popular novel: ‘Thousands of dangerous
killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw
regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time
bombs, set to go off without warning’.[49]
In other speeches, officials inflate the numbers of the
terrorists to ‘tens of thousands’ of killers spread
throughout the world. The
next layer of fear is the notion that the threat resides within; that
it is no longer confined outside the borders of the community, but
that it is inside of us and all around us. As Ashcroft constructs it: The
attacks of September 11 were acts of terrorism against Like
the ‘red scares’ of the past, the discourse of danger is deployed
in this mode to enforce social discipline, mute dissent, and increase
the powers of the national security state. It is designed to bring the
war home, or, as Bush puts it: ‘And make no mistake about it,
we’ve got a war here just like we’ve got a war abroad’.[51]
In another genealogical link to previous American foreign policy, the threat of terrorism is from a very early stage reflexively conflated with the threat of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and the ‘rogue states’ who might hand them on to terrorists. According to the discourse, rogue states are apparently eager to assist terrorists in killing millions of Americans. As Bush stated in his now infamous ‘axis of evil’ speech, States
like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil,
arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They
could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to
match their hatred.[52]
This
is actually an ingenious discursive slight of hand which allows Instead of reassuring the nation that the attacks were an exceptional and a unique event in a long line of terrorist attacks against America (that have thus far failed to overthrow freedom), the Bush administration chose instead to construct them as the start of a whole new age of terror—the start of a deadly new form of violence directed at Americans, civilized people all over the world, freedom and democracy. The Bush administration could have chosen to publicize the conclusions of the Gilmore Commission in 1999, a Clinton-appointed advisory panel on the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Its final report concluded that ‘rogue states would hesitate to entrust such weapons to terrorists because of the likelihood that such a group’s actions might be unpredictable even to the point of using the weapon against its sponsor’, and they would be reluctant to use such weapons themselves due to ‘the prospect of significant reprisals’.[55] Condoleeza Rice herself wrote in 2000 that there was no need to panic about rogue states, because ‘if they do acquire WMD—their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration’.[56] Instead, officials engaged in the deliberate construction of a world of unimaginable dangers and unspeakable threats; they encouraged social fear and moral panic. Within the suffocating confines of such an emergency, where Americans measure their daily safety by the color of a national terrorist alert scale (reflected in the glow of every traffic light), it seems perfectly reasonable that the entire resources of the state be mobilized in defense of the homeland, and that pre-emptive war should be pursued. It also seems reasonable that national unity be maintained and expressions of dissent curtailed. The reality effect of scripting such a powerful danger moreover, can be seen in the two major wars fought in two years (followed by costly ongoing ‘security operations’ in each of those states to root out the terrorists), the arrest of thousands of suspects in America and around the world, and the vast sums spent unquestioningly (even by the Democrats) on domestic security, border control and the expansion of the military. Only the ‘reality’ of the threat of terrorism allows such extravagance; in fact, the manner in which the threat has been constructed -catastrophic, ubiquitous and ongoing- normalizes the entire effort. If an alternative interpretation of the threat emerged to challenge the dominant orthodoxy (that it was vastly over-blown, or misdirected, for example), support for the consumption of such massive amounts of resources might be questioned and the political order destabilized. A massive threat of terrorism then, is necessary for the continued viability of the ‘war on terrorism’; writing the threat of terrorism is co-constitutive of the practice of counter-terrorism. Conclusion:
Language, Politics, and Resistance Applying a ‘critical’ perspective to the language of
counter-terrorism, it can be argued that the ‘war on terrorism’
and its domination of public political discourse in The simple reason for this tacit complicity is that these kinds of all
encompassing and smothering discourses destabilise the moral community
and replace non-violent political interaction with suspicion, fear,
hatred, chauvinism and an impulse to violently defend the ‘imagined
community’. In addition, they automatically foreclose certain kinds
of thought, simply because the language with which to frame doubts or
question official justifications no longer exists or is inaccessible.
While some individuals may initially feel unease at pictures of abused
and humiliated ‘terrorist’ suspects at This is also an example of the well-known mimetic nature of
violence—the instinctual psychological tendency to respond to an act
of violence with identical or greater violence, to mimic the
attacker—which has been a feature of virtually every war and
counter-terrorist campaign. Charles Townshend argues that, ‘Probably
the biggest hazard inherent in reactions to terrorism is the impulse
towards imitation.’[58]
History is replete with examples of just such mimetic
counter-terrorist violence: Israel’s targeted killings and
assassinations mimic Palestinian attacks on Israelis; in Northern
Ireland the British security services mimicked the IRA when it too
began killing members of the para-militaries extra-judicially; and
during Reagan’s war against terrorism, CIA officers in Beirut
tortured suspects to death during interrogation and then sponsored a
car bomb aimed at Sheik Fadlallah in revenge for the Marine barracks
bombing—it missed the Sheik but killed 92 bystanders and injured
more than 250 others.[59]
Within the atmosphere created by the present discourse of
counter-terrorism it passes almost unnoticed that both sides (America
and al Qaeda) are employing exactly the same discursive
strategies—both appeal to victim-hood and grievance, both enlist
religion as supreme justification, both frame the struggle as one of
good versus evil, both demonise and dehumanise the other and both
claim the mantle of a just/holy war/jihad.[60]
The result of this discursive mirroring is predictable: the killing of
civilians without pity or remorse, whether by suicide bombers hoping
to force the American military out of Iraq and Saudi Arabia or by
Apache helicopters hoping to suppress the rebellion in Fallujah. There is no escape from the fact that in American and Britain
discrimination and the abuse of human rights has now been normalised
and is considered an inevitable if regrettable part of the
counter-terrorist effort, including judicial abuse, torture and war
crimes; we are now firmly ensconced in a ‘dirty war on
terrorism’ both at home and abroad. This is a perilous position for
a society supposedly built on the belief in human dignity, human
rights and democratic participation. It implies that we have retreated
from a universal and cosmopolitan vision of society to a
particularistic, tribal vision; that we have bankrupted our moral
vision of universal human rights and social inclusion in favour of a
dubious sense of ‘national’ security. In the past, such narrow
communitarian formulations of political life have led to debilitating
cycles of inter-national violence, or at the very least, long periods
of institutional and cultural racism against an ‘enemy within’.
The greatest danger of the current discourse is that we too become
terrorists; and that as we demonise, dehumanise and brutalise the
enemy ‘other’ it becomes a war of terrorisms, rather than a
war on terrorism. The corrosive effects of the discourse are already plain to see:
anti-globalisation protesters, academics, postmodernists, liberals,
pro-choice activists, environmentalists and gay liberationists are
accused of being aligned with the evil of terrorism and of undermining
the nation’s struggle against terrorism;[61]
arms trade protesters are arrested under anti-terrorism legislation;
blacklists of ‘disloyal’ professors, university departments,
journalists, writers and commentators are posted on the internet and
smear campaigns are launched against them; anti-administration voices
are kept away from speaking at public events or in the media; and
political opponents of government policy are accused of being
traitors. There is a real danger that the ‘war on terrorism’ is
expanding to become a ‘war on dissent’ or a ‘war on politics’.
Such a war, of course, can only result in the eventual death of
participatory democracy and the decay of civil society, not in the
destruction of terrorism. Another danger is that the discursive straightjacket of the ‘war on
terrorism’ prevents clear and creative thinking about alternative
strategies and approaches to sub-state violence; instead, it
institutionalises an approach to counter-terrorism which has already
proved to be counterproductive and damaging to the very institutions
and values America and its allies are purportedly trying to protect.
There is a genuine risk that the moral absolutism of the discourse
induces political amnesia about the failures and lessons from other
counter-terrorist campaigns.[62]
For example, a clear lesson from other campaigns is that terrorism can
never be defeated by military force or coercion alone; it only eases
when political compromise takes place on the issues that instigated
it. At the very least, the discourse is actually misconceiving and
misunderstanding the nature of the threat and the strategies required
to deal with it—it is poor ‘threat assessment’ and poor
‘mission definition’, to use military parlance. By deliberately
obfuscating the underlying history and context of terrorism, the
actual nature and causes of terrorism and the real motivations and
aims of the terrorists (who are most certainly not sacrificing their
lives in suicidal attacks simply for the sake of ‘evil’), the
search for more effective and long-term policy solutions is
cauterised. Given the intellectual cul-de-sac of the ‘war on terrorism’, it is
not surprising that the Bush administration’s present policies are
actually making terrorism worse and are intensifying those global
conditions that encourage, nurture and sustain endemic violence.[63]
It now seems clear that the ‘war on terrorism’ is already
entrenching an ever deepening cycle of violence and counter-violence
similar to that which has already occurred at a micro-level in Israel,
Chechnya, Kashmir, Colombia and Spain (to name a few), where neither
side can win decisively but no party is willing to abandon the
military option. In strategic terms, there are good reasons for
thinking that American actions in In large part, it was (and still is) the nature of the political
discourse that has prevented the consideration of alternative
paradigms and approaches to counter-terrorism; the inbuilt logic of
the language, and the privileging of only certain kinds of knowledge,
has circumvented the kind of in-depth, rigorous and informed debate
that a complex political challenge such as terrorism requires. Unless
we break out of the stultifying confines of the discourse, more
effective policies will continue to prove elusive; unless or until
both politicians and the wider public learn to speak and think in a
language outside of the official rhetoric, we are condemned to live
under an endless spiral of terrorist violence and state
counter-violence. In a sense, the only hope of ever winning the ‘war
on terrorism’ lies in ceasing to invest in its bankrupt philosophy. Beyond this self-interested concern for greater security however, there
is another reason for resisting the language of counter-terrorism: it
is damaging to our moral values and to our political life, and in the
process, people are being violated, abused and killed. We are
implicated in this monstrosity as citizens, and fail in our academic
responsibilities, if we sit back and do nothing. As David Campbell
expressed it, ‘to live ethically, we must think and act
politically.’[64]
For this reason, we have an ethical duty to resist the discourse, to
deconstruct it at every opportunity and to continually interrogate the
exercise of power masquerading as the ‘war on terrorism’.
Proceed to: A
Response from Jonathan Rodwell
[1]
This paper draws mainly on my forthcoming book, Writing the War
on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism ( [2]
Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse Analysis as
Theory and Method ( [3]
See for example, Rahul
Mahajan, Full Spectrum Dominance: [4]
See John Collins
and Ross Glover, eds., Collateral Language: A User’s Guide to America’s New War
(New York: New York University Press, 2002); Sandra Silberstein, War
of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11 (London: Routledge,
2002); John Murphy, ‘“Our mission
and our moment”: George W. Bush and September 11’, Rhetoric
and Public Affairs 6, vol. 4 (2003); Joseba Zulaika
and William Douglass, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables,
and Faces of Terrorism (New York and London: Routledge, 1996). [5]
See Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it’, International
Organization 46 (1992), pp. 391-425; David Campbell, Writing
Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of
Identity, Revised edition, (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1998). [6]
Martin Wight, Power Politics, edited by H. Bull and C.
Holbraad, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978); see
also Hurrell, ‘“There are no Rules” (George W. Bush):
International Order after September 11’, International
Relations 16, vol.2 (2002), pp. 185-204. [7]
See William Wallace, ‘Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats:
Theory and Practice in International Relations’, Review of
International Studies 22 (1996), pp. 301-321. [8]
Marina Llorente, ‘Civilization versus barbarism’, in Collins
and Glover, eds., Collateral
Language, p. 39. [9]
John Collins
and Ross Glover, ‘Introduction’, in Collins and Glover, eds., Collateral Language,
p. 4. [10]
Michel Foucault, Discipline
and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage,
1977). [11]
Collins
and Glover, ‘Introduction’, pp. 9-10. [12]
The
history of the word ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ is a
pertinent example of this process. Initially, the word was used to
describe the actions of states against their own people: the Great
Terror of the French Revolution; Stalin’s purges; the Nazi
terror state. To a lesser extent, it was also used to describe the
actions of some anarchists of the late nineteenth century. Since
the 1960s however, government officials, the media and many
academics have used the term to characterise the use of violence
by small groups of dissidents or revolutionaries to intimidate or
influence the state. This strategic and repetitious usage has
given the term a new popular meaning: the word ‘terrorist’ is
hardly ever used now to describe state policies of repression or
intimidation, but instead is almost exclusively used to describe
the illegitimate acts of individuals or small groups of
dissidents. [13]
R. Rubenstein, Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the
Modern World (New York: Basic books, 1987). [14]
Jorgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and
Method, pp.
60-71. [15]
N. Fairclough, Media
Discourse (London: Edward Arnold, 1995), p. 14. [16]
N. Fairclough, Discourse
and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 87. [17]
Ibid. [18]
The
reason for focusing on these particular texts and not the
documents of law enforcement officials or the content of websites,
for example, is that these speeches represent the source of the
discourse. The ‘war on terrorism’ is an elite led project and
these elites have provided the primary justifications and overall
vision. [19]
Murphy, ‘“Our [20]
See [21]
See [22]
See Murphy, ‘“Our [23]
See Samuel Weber, ‘War, Terrorism,
and Spectacle: On Towers and Caves’, The South Atlantic
Quarterly 101, vol. 3 (2002), p. 452. [24]
President
George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, [25]
See Murphy, ‘“Our [26]
James Aune, ‘The Argument from Evil in the Rhetoric of
Reaction’, Rhetoric and Public Affairs 6, vol. 3 (2003),
pp. 518-522. [27]
President
George W. Bush,
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John
Ashcroft, Remarks at [28]
Colin L. Powell, Remarks by the Secretary of State to the National
Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental
Organisations (NGO), [29]
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, Briefing on Enduring Freedom, The
Pentagon, [30]
President George W. Bush, The State of
the Union Address, [31]
Howard H. Baker Jr., U.S. Ambassador, Japanese Observance
Ceremony for Victims of Terrorism in the [32]
President George W. Bush, Remarks in Commencement Address To [33]
Attorney General John Ashcroft, News Conference with Immigration
and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar, and Steve
McCraw, newly appointed director Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task
Force, Department of Justice Conference Center, [34]
See Zulaika and Douglass, Terror
and Taboo. [35]
President George W. Bush, President’s Remarks at National Day of
Prayer and Remembrance, the National Cathedral, Washington, D.C.,
September 14, 2001. [36]
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense,
Remarks at a Memorial
Service in Remembrance of Those Lost on September 11th,
The Pentagon, [37]
[38]
See Robert Hariman, ‘Speaking of Evil’, Rhetoric and Public
Affairs 6, vol. 3 (2003), pp. 511-517; Murray Edelman, The
Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois
press, 1964); Barry
Glassner, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong
Things (New York: Basic Books, 1999). [39]
See Mark Lynas ‘Essay: The Sixth Mass Extinction’, New
Statesman, [40]
George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People, [41]
Dick Cheney, Vice-President, Remarks to the American Society of
News Editors, The Fairmont Hotel, [42]
Powell, Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference, [43]
Bush, Address to a Joint Session, [44]
Bush, State of the Union Address,
[45]
Cheney, Remarks to the American Society
of News Editors, [46]
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Prepared Testimony:
‘Building a military for the 21st century’, To the Senate
Armed Services Committee, [47]
John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Testimony to House Committee on
the Judiciary, [48]
Bush, Address to a Joint Session, [49]
Bush, State of the Union Address,
[50]
John Ashcroft, Attorney General,
Prepared Remarks for the [51]
George W. Bush, Presidential Remarks to [52]
Bush, State of the Union Address,
[53]
Quoted in John Kampfner, Blair’s Wars ( [54]
See Mahajan, Full
Spectrum Dominance; Callinicos, The
New Mandarins of American Power; Boggs,
‘Introduction: Empire and Globalization’, in
Boggs, ed., Masters of War. [55]
Quoted in Hiro, War Without
End, p. 391. [56]
Quoted in Callinicos, The
New Mandarins, p. 44. [57]
Drakulic quoted in E.
Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbor’s
House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda ( [58]
Charles Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction ( [59]
David Wills, The First War on Terrorism: Counter-terrorism
Policy During the Reagan Administration
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 56, 87. [60]
See
Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After
September 11 ( [61]
See David Campbell,
‘Time is Broken: The Return of the Past in the Response to
September 11’, Theory & Event, 5, vol. 4 (2002). [62]
Ibid. [63]
See
Boggs,
Masters of War;
Callinicos,
The New Mandarins; Mahajan,
Full Spectrum Dominance; Malik, Shattered Illusions. [64]
David Campbell, ‘Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles and
Post-Structuralism’, Millennium 27 vol.3, (1998), p. 519.
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