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Some thoughts on Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force by Dr David Jordan We are not seeking to
destabilize his regime. Secretary of Defense William Cohen made this assertion at
the afternoon Department of Defense briefing on 18 December 1998, when questioned about
the purpose of Operation Desert Fox. Desert Fox was the latest in a long line of
operations against the immovable Saddam Hussein. Rather like Operation El Dorado Canyon
against Libya in 1986, the aim of Desert Fox was to demonstrate to a rather unpleasant
dictator that attempting to spread instability would not be accepted. The possibility that
the dictatorial regime might be part of the collateral damage was an unspoken hope, but
not a deliberate aim. US diplomacy is currently conducted through three prime agencies:
the State Department, Air Combat Command of the USAF and US Naval Aviation. This trend
originates not in the spectacular success of aerial bombardment in the Persian Gulf in
1991, but in the darker days of Vietnam. It seems that the video game dimension of air
warfare (the viewer sees a nice explosion, impressive damage but no body parts) is having
an effect on US foreign policy. Imbued with what Roger Waters termed the bravery of
being out of range, when careful and patient diplomacy does not bring quick results,
aerial bombardment is turned to. This has several dislocating effects on the realities of
dealing with foreign policy problems, the most serious of which means that in spite of
military success, diplomatic objectives are ever more difficult to attain. Sophisticated
diplomacy has given way to sophisticated weaponry and a paucity of ideas. This is now
being seen all too readily in Kosovo, where US-led NATO air action seems to be the only
response to the problem that the State Department can come up with. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the US armed forces were at their
lowest ebb. Although the US armed services made hugely impressive recovery, Vietnam has
coloured the approach to dealing with situations where military force might be
appropriate. The overwhelming desire to see minimal friendly casualties has led to a
reliance upon high technology Precision-Guided Munitions and their conveyance to enemy
territory by aircraft. To limit the risk of casualties even further, the first wave of
airpower sent in nowadays is often precision guided not by the brain of a human in an
aircraft, but a computer chip. Once the cruise missiles have hit their targets degrading
the air defence systems of the opposition, manned aircraft can be sent in. Operation
Desert Fox demonstrated that this sometimes works very well, in spite of cynical press
comment. Allied Force, on the other hand, shows clearly that a lack of clear policy means
that although friendly casualties are minimal, the objectives are far from clear and the
use of air power is consequently ineffective. Desert Foxs origins lie firmly in the Gulf War; not only was
the operation a result of Saddam Husseins continuing intransigence, but its
conduct owed much to the use of air power in the conflict. The TV-friendly images from
Riyadh established a whole new foreign policy paradigm for the USA. And herein lies the
problem of Desert Fox. Just as in Vietnam, the TV pictures from the 1991 conflict did not
tell the whole story. Precision guided weapons were an undoubted success. The Iraqi air
force commander no doubt found that his office was a mess after a 2,000-pound laser-guided
bomb blew the walls of the building out. Countless other pictures of laser- and
electro-optically guided weapons seemed to show that the era of one target, one
bomb had arrived. This was an illusion. We did not see the laser-guided weapons
which went wild and missed their targets. Like friendly fire, the
dispassionate observer has to grit their teeth and accept that these things happen.
Everything works perfectly until the guidance system decides not to function, and then the
bomb goes where it pleases. The irony is that the design of the laser-guided weapon means
that it is less dependent on ballistics, and will tend to miss the target by a greater
margin than an unguided dumb bomb if its guidance system doesnt work. To
fly the laser-guided bomb to its target, the pilot of the aircraft aims to toss the bomb
into a funnel of reflected laser energy (the laser energy being provided by the system
designating the target), and the mechanical guidance fins on the bomb fly the weapon down
the funnel. If they fail to work for any reason, the bomb becomes a small unguided
aircraft looking for somewhere to crash. An old fashioned dumb bomb simply
follows orders given to it by gravity. Furthermore, the amount of precision-guided
weaponry used was far less than the World War Two style iron bomb, rockets, and cluster
bombs, all aimed with through pilot skill and some clever aircraft avionics. A final
consideration is that no matter how accurate your weapons, if the intelligence information
which guides your targeting decisions is flawed, civilians using a military bunker as a
shelter will die a horrible death and in large numbers. These inconvenient facts were generally ignored. What Desert Storm
demonstrated was that a combination of firepower and high technology could move warfare
away from the traditional model. Troops were only needed to take over the ground vacated
by a beaten enemy; where the enemy had decided to stay put, the might of armoured attack
soon dealt with them. Troops could be saved from the rigours of ground war. Casualties
could be numbered in the tens rather than the thousands. All thanks to air power and
precision-guided weapons. As General David Deptula put it, air power no longer prepared
the battlefield: it destroyed it. This may have an element of truth in it. Troop casualties can be
vastly reduced by the employment of massive amounts of air-delivered weaponry. The effect
of being bombed by three B-52s (the standard formation) has an incredible morale effect.
One Iraqi officer, asked why he had surrendered, said because of the B-52
attacks. His interrogators were puzzled. But you werent bombed by
B-52s, they said. No but I saw a unit which had, the Iraqi
officer said with some feeling. Iraqi tanks and armoured fighting vehicles had been
reduced in huge numbers, partly through the use of the A-10 attack aircraft (designed to
destroy them) and partly through the use of 500-pound laser-guided bombs dropped by F-111s
(which were not). The latter practice, prosaically known as tank plinking, had
an enormous effect on the number of vehicles left to fight the Allies (which, when
confronted by the M1 Abrams and the British Challenger tank, did not make much of an
impact). All this is good news for the humble infantry man. It is excellent news for the
politician, desirous of low casualty figures. It is bad news for sensible foreign policy. Desert Storm gave the impression that air power can, with a little
effort and a lot of investment, solve all problems. Why, then, did Desert Fox succeed in
its aims, and why, at time of writing, is Allied Force proving to be a confused affair?
The first answer comes in the conception of the two operations. It needs to be noted that
an air campaign of the intensity of Desert Fox cannot depend upon the dictates of Congress
deciding that the Presidents desire to befriend his interns merits impeachment.
There is a common perception that Bill Clinton ordered the bombers in to deflect attention
from his inability to keep his hands off members of the opposite sex (apart, it seems,
from the First Lady) and the military simply said Yes, Mr President, well save
you and got on with it. This was hardly the case. A four-day air attack on military
facilities requires extremely careful and precise planning. This had been under way for a
considerable time before Kenneth Starr was to enjoy (or should that be endure?) his moment
in court. This perception no doubt arises because unlike the Gulf War, the air attacks
lasted for four days only. What damage could they achieve, we are asked. The answer, in
simple terms, is lots. When Desert Fox opened, the targets had been carefully identified.
The weapons used are formidable. The standard laser-guided bomb was not the only type of
weapon to be employed. In the Gulf War itself, 288 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles
(TLAMs)
were launched from US Naval vessels. The Tomahawk remains in service, but in a much more
accurate version (currently landing in Serbian factory complexes) as the guidance
technology has improved further. The Air Force did not make much of a contribution to the
despatch of cruise missiles in the Gulf War itself. During the Cold War, the USAF had
employed B-52s armed with the AGM-86 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), which carried a
nuclear warhead. Unbeknown to the world at large, in the latter part of the 1980s, it was
decided to rearm some of the missiles with conventional warheads, containing 2,000 pounds
of high explosive (the new weapon being known as a Conventional Air Launched Cruise
Missile, or CALCM). Thirty five of these weapons were fired in 1991, with a further 13
being used in 1996 when operation Desert Strike was launched to try to persuade Saddam to
behave. These weapons were impressively accurate in 1991. By the time of Desert Fox, they
had been significantly improved. The warhead size has been increased to 3,000 pounds,
while the guidance system relies upon an improved Global Positioning System (GPS).
Essentially, GPS allows the missiles brain to work out exactly where
over the earths surface. It then compares this position with the position of its
target (already known to the missile) and then follows the directions until it and the
target coincide. The new GPS system in the AGM-86C Block 1 is assessed as being twice as
accurate as the previous model. Thus, the cruise missile was to dominate Desert Fox. The plan for the operation was simple. The targets in
heavily-defended Baghdad would first be hit by cruise missiles, since this minimised risk
to pilots. In the second wave, the air defence system throughout Iraq would be attacked,
to allow greater freedom of action for manned aircraft. The attacks by cruise missiles
appear to have been devastatingly effective. Since Saddam, in yet another stunning display
of good judgement, decided that the impeachment proceedings in Washington and the
proximity of Ramadan would prevent any attack being made on him, he had not placed his
forces on any particular level of high alert, or moved them from their bases. Clearly,
sanctions have at least prevented pirated copies of Wag the Dog from finding their
way into the Hussein family VCR. Saddam may have been influenced by the fact that B-52s
had not arrived on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, which had always been the sign that
trouble was imminent in the past. The results of this surprise were significant. Bomb damage assessment (BDA) suggests that the cruise missile
attacks were hugely effective. It was first thought that the Baath Party
headquarters in Baghdad the suspected hiding place of the documents which the
UNSCOM inspectors wished to see had been superficially damaged, since only a few
neat holes in the roof were to be seen. It seemed that the CALCMs had not done their job.
In fact, closer examination revealed that while the building was still standing, most of
its interior was in fact lying in small pieces on the formerly neatly-manicured lawns. The
missiles had punched their way in through the roof and penetrated deep into the building
before exploding. Although it is hard for most of us to appreciate just how severe the
damage caused to a building by just ten pounds of explosive can be, it does not take much
imagination to work out that 3,000 pounds of explosive is going to create considerable
damage. As far as is known, few, if any casualties were inflicted. The same can be said
for most of the targets hit during the campaign. Although pictures of injured civilians
were seen, the Iraqis made a few blunders in their propaganda. The BBC crew who were taken
to see a residential block hit by a cruise missile made the unfortunate decision (for
Iraqi propaganda purposes) to take a wide angle shot. A crater in the ground was visible,
and the buildings had suffered extensive shrapnel damage. The problem was that the nature
of the block was such that the detonation of a 1,000 pound warhead in the confined area of
that particular block would have demolished it, probably killing all present. The
detonation of a Surface to Air Missile (SAM) which had been launched in spite of the fact
that there was no target for it to lock onto and which had headed back to earth would have
inflicted remarkably similar damage to that shown on screen. The TV pictures also showed
what was supposedly the engine of the cruise missile. We did not quite see the words
made in Russia on the side of the remnants, but the pictures add credence to
the notion that a lot of the indiscriminate damage to the civilian areas was caused by
SAMs falling out of the sky when their fuel ran out. This is not to say that there were no civilian casualties. Anyone
who believes that there were not must be either naïve or incredibly optimistic.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that many of the casualties seen in the TV pictures
beamed around the world on the first night of the attack were injured by their own side.
It is easy to take the view that they would not have been injured had the Americans not
attacked; but it should be pointed out that the North Vietnamese generally avoided such
problems by simply fusing their missile warheads to explode while still airborne if they
did not acquire a target. There were certainly heavy casualties among a defined target for
attack, namely the Republican Guard. The Republican Guard were recognised as the mainstay
of Saddams regime in 1991, and had demonstrated this quite clearly by being the most
unpleasant hosts to the UNSCOM inspectors. They were bombed heavily. The BDA pictures of
the Al-Kut barracks, attacked by B-1Bs (which, incidentally, carries a heavier bombload
than the B-52), display a large number of craters running through accommodation blocks.
These scenes were repeated at other Republican Guard installations. Whether the Republican
Guard lost large numbers of men or not, the point that they are now firmly targeted was
made. Finally, significant destruction was caused to Saddams
capacity to make WMDs and to his air defence system. These two points may seem
controversial, but there are several key points to be made. First, to hide his WMD
delivery systems (the Scud and its Iraqi variants) from the UNSCOM inspectors, Saddam took
the precaution of having them dismantled and hidden. A number of the suspected hiding
places were struck (the policy of keeping the inspectors out of certain places helped plan
the target list). Furthermore, to rebuild the weapons, a special metal press is required.
It seems that Saddam had only managed to invest in one of these, and it is now believed
that this has been destroyed. The destruction of the remotely-piloted aircraft converted
for the dispersion of chemical and biological weapons further degraded
Saddams capacity to cause mischief in the near future. Perhaps the more
controversial of the two claims made above is that the Iraqi air defence network was
damaged, If this is the case, you may well be asking, how is it that USAF and RAF aircraft
have been attacking Iraqi air defence sites on an almost daily basis? The answer cannot be
definite, since the Pentagon are not saying, but a combination of BDA photographs and
well-sourced rumour suggests that the central repair plant for SAMs and their radars was
utterly destroyed in the attack. Saddams continuing targeting of USAF and RAF
aircraft in the no-fly zones may well be a desperate attempt to destroy an aircraft before
the whole air defence network collapses about his ears through lack of maintenance. Even here, Saddam may be fighting a losing battle. The Electronic
Warfare capacity of the USAF and US Navy is such that when the Gulf War began, the jamming
of Iraqi radar and communications systems was conducted with such brute electronic force
that a polite protest was received from Bulgaria. Bulgarias difficulty was that the
jamming was so extensive that it was interfering with its radar network. The Soviet
Unions motto on the matter of confounding radar and communications networks ran
roughly along the lines of jam one third, destroy one third and the rest will
collapse by itself. This was proved correct in 1991, and since the jamming and
destructive capacity of the US forces has not diminished, it is not impossible to
visualise the future destruction of the Iraqi air defence network. Nonetheless, Saddam is still there. He may be shooting his generals
on a regular basis (neatly ignoring the fact that only Joseph Stalin has got away with
this sort of thing when facing a major military threat) to ensure he keeps his grip, but
he is still there. Without ground forces, he will not be dislodged, unless there is a
coup. Nonetheless, Desert Fox worked it had limited objectives, which were not
clearly understood by a sceptical press, and achieved them: the WMD capacity of Iraq was
reduced considerably; the Republican Guard was weakened; military unrest was fermented,
and, in spite of the rapid and ruthless response by Saddam, he must be a little worried.
The recognition that the Iraqi opposition needs helping probably also is of concern to
Saddam: it would seem that Desert Fox may mark the start of a coherent, careful and
well-considered long-term plan which will ultimately topple Saddam. The past record of the
US in this field does not exactly inspire confidence in success, but it may well happen.
The removal of sanctions in some areas may well help add to Saddams insecurity,
since it would be more difficult for him to blame the US for shortages if sanctions on
non-military essentials are lifted. Of course, there is always the risk that a tottering
Saddam might use his weapons of mass destruction, but his behaviour during the Gulf War
suggests that even he has his doubts as to what the US response would be if he did so (the
word massive ought to feature in his considerations). Somehow, be it an
indigenous revolt or one inspired by the arrival of US tanks, Saddams fate will be
decided on the ground, and not thanks to air power. Desert Fox recognised this, even if
this was not perceived at the time by a press more eager to tie the air assault in with
Monica Lewinskys lack of appreciation of the value of a good dry-cleaning service. Just as we might think that the US has a considered policy for
appropriate use of air power, along comes Allied Force. The mission, designed to prevent
the ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians has given Serb forces and irregulars the chance
to increase their rate of doing so. While it is folly to argue that the attacks are not
having an effect on the Yugoslav military, and are not causing high civilian casualties,
it is not difficult to contend that the situation could have been handled rather better.
Military commanders are not, contrary to satirical belief, stupid people, and it is hard
not to suspect that, while they are fully backing the plan laid down by their political
masters (as they should do in a democracy), they might have the notion that ground troops
could have solved problems. Ground troops would also cause political problems, especially
with Moscow, though, so how to deal with the difficulties? There are a number of answers. The presence of a hundred or more AH-64 Apache attack helicopters,
would have made ethnic cleansing rather more difficult. The Apaches price tag gives
a hint of its all-weather capability. Formations of AH-64s, equipped with eight Hellfire
missiles, nineteen rockets and an external fuel tank to give them more loiter time
operating out of Bosnia, Albania or Macedonia could perambulate across a wide area of
Kosovo at a speed which enables them to locate targets in a manner which fast-mover attack
aircraft cannot. While the USAF has the A-10 attack aircraft to deal with tanks and other
targets, it has a very limited adverse weather capacity, and operating at night is
difficult (were it not for skilled pilots, it might be impossible). The Apache has none of
these difficulties: operating at very low level, at the dead of night and in foul weather,
AH-64s have the ability to seriously inconvenience ground troops ethnic cleansing
on the scale seen would have been considerably reduced if the units carrying it out had
been targeted around the clock. Why was this not done? The answer is probably
risk. Using AH-64s from the start would have required aircrews to operate in a
potentially dangerous environment over hostile territory. In daylight operations, it is a
fair to guess that there would have been some damage inflicted on the AH-64s (although in
the Gulf, this was far lower than even optimists would have predicted), and possibly
aircrew casualties. The main problem, though, is that there seems to be no clear
objective. What is Allied Force trying to achieve, exactly? The worrying thing is that
no-one quite seems to know. Whether military action is the only way, or whether diplomacy should
have been given a chance is now irrelevant. The key point is that the surgical
element to air power has blinded Western and especially US politicians. Military action is
never easy. People die. Lives are shattered. Sometimes there may be no alternative to
force. But if force is to be applied, it must be applied properly. Were Serbian air
defences firing at passing airliners, then taking down their air defence network would be
the correct answer. When the problem is groups of armed men on the ground massacring
citizens of a different ethnic grouping, then a cruise missile hitting a radar site makes
no difference. An attack helicopter or a Main Battle Tank does. Air power can destroy an
enemy armys equipment, its manpower and even its morale. It cannot occupy ground,
and it cannot protect civilians. It cannot overthrow dictators, and it cannot establish
safe havens for persecuted ethnic groupings. Land forces can do all of these things. In
Iraq and in Kosovo, the issue will be finally settled on the ground. All instances of
military action beyond punitive raids require ground troops. Field Marshal Auchinleck once
made the remark that the time would always come when Private Snodgrass must advance
to his front. The new US foreign policy/power projection paradigm seeks to leave him
in his barracks. This is misguided. Although the risks may be unappealing, if the US is to
achieve the foreign policy objectives it strives for, it has to take them. The question
remains, though, of whether it is willing to do so. Links: http://www.af.mil/current/iraq2/ http://www.af.mil/current/iraq2/iraqcurrent.htm http://www.af.mil/current/iraq2/archive.htm http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/AGM_86B_C_Missiles.html http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/B_52_Stratofortress.html http://www.af.mil/lib/globalon/ http://www.xp.hq.af.mil/xpx/21/intro.htm http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/desert_fox/ NATO and NATO Southern Command sites for
Kosovo: http://www.nato.int/latest/home.htm Tomahawk Cruise Missile fact sheet
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