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Dislocations: Transatlantic Perspectives on Postnational American Studies

Postnational Politics and American Studies

Donald Pease
Dartmouth College

In her 1998 Presidential address to the American Studies Association, "What's in a Name", Janice Radway asked the members whether they wished to disassociate from the nationalist assumptions sedimented within the organization's name.1. In addressing this question to the disparate international and transnational as well as sub-national research communities out of which the American Studies Association was comprised, Radway encouraged the membership to reconceptualize the terms of their affiliation. The interrogative "What's in a Name?" produced a space in between the American Studies Association and those members who either felt their work had been misrepresented within that categorization, or who found it too restrictive, or insufficiently accommodating. If "American" would not secure for the Association a name to which all of its members would want to answer, perhaps a crisis in the name could. America, americanness and americanization--all of these terms possessed their own intelligibility and the question Radway raised was if we are stuck with the name American Studies Association how can what remains unrepresentable in it be brought to bear on its effects?

To undermine "America's" power to totalize the field and unify the membership, Radway's emphasized the fluidity and the self-difference in the "studies" to which the organization's disparate members had devoted themselves. When she analyzed the impact of a wide range of discursive formations--British Cultural Studies, the discourse of the borderlands and the critique of US imperialism--on the field of American Studies, Radway articulated the question which she addressed to the convention with the challenges posed by americanists whose scholarship intersected with critical race theory, Black Atlantic studies, women's studies, post-colonial theory, subaltern studies and transnational feminist and queer studies. These scholars did not conceptualize identities as separate essences sheltered within an encompassing national territory, but as cross-cutting, insurgent, often oppositional identifications that empowered coalitions within but also across national borders. The fact that these americanists were committed to political goals that traversed national boundaries severely undermined the idea of a bounded national territory and a coherent national identity to which the American Studies Association had formerly adhered.

The interrogative power of Radway's talk presupposed the declining power of the nation-state. By convoking the convention around the question of the name its members wished to be called, Radway had in effect inaugurated Postnational American Studies. "What's in a Name" lay claim to the radical democratic energies mobilized by challenges to US nationalism and resituated them in an understanding of what Radway called the "intricate interdependency" of questions of race, gender, identity, sexualities outside of a nationalist framework. The postnational dimension of Radway's address drew upon her description of American Culture as itself the product of a range of complex processes. The United States "is relationally defined and historically and situationally variable," Radway observed apropos of this reorientation. "because it is dependent upon and therefore intertwined with those affiliations, identities, and communities it must actively subordinate in order to press the privileged claims of the nation upon individuals and groups."2

Radway's efforts to promote work that would further reconceptualize "America" as involved in relations of "intricate interdependency" led her to ask whether it would not make sense to think about renaming the association. In her response to this question, Radway proposed that the field might be renamed "Inter-American Studies" or 'International Studies of the United States" or the "Society of Intercultural Studies" so as to encourage alternatives to models of American Studies that moved from the U.S. center.

While each iteration of the association's name performed a summons to the discrete communities whose research it most clearly resembled, all of these nominations drew upon widely published internal debates over the future of the association and of the field. Individually and collectively these proposed names reimagined the nation as the outcome of complex social formations profoundly linked up with the exercise of power and thereby authorized the study of non-national and transnational negotiations of identity that cut across national borders.

The responses to Radway's address ranged from thoughtful criticism of its perceived limitations to heated denunciation of its putative intentions. "What's in a Name?" was interpreted in some quarters as a call to bring the American Studies Association to an end or to suppress methodologies that did not conform with the imperatives of the redescribed field. Other members of the American Studies Association found that in raising these questions Radway had been disrespectful of a field whose members were committed to diversity and who had already fostered many of the changes in orientation she recommended. Still others questioned whether the newly named field was supposed to describe their work or merely facilitate the outcomes Radway had aspired to achieve. Despite the fact that Radway situated postnational American Studies within a global analytic frame and insisted that programs in American Studies would be reshaped anew in different institutional sites out of their specific negotiations with globalization, however, her remarks were interpreted in national as well as international sectors of the American Studies Association as yet another example of the domination of the field by americanists based in the metropolitan centers of the US.

Members of the American Studies Association who were opposed to the new appellation found a rationale for their resistance to Inter-American Studies in the previously published work of the U.S. based Chicano scholar, Jose David Saldivar. Saldivar had criticized advocates of Inter-American Studies for their tendency to conflate the divergent histories of nation formation and to homogenize the specific geopolitical histories of different racial and ethnic groups. Saldivar tellingly described the notion of the postnational as a category that threatened to become at least as totalizing as the category it would supplant. 3

The Argentinian scholar Walter Mignolo had discerned in comparativist studies of the Americas tendencies toward categorical overgeneralization and ideological vagueness which would further contribute to the depoliticization of the field. Remarking a correlation between this comparativist hemispheric model and the U.S. imperialism to which it was putatively opposed, Mignolo warned that Postnational American Studies would thereby authorize a scholarly archive which would continue U.S. dominance through the very mechanisms whereby it was declared over. 4.

According to Saldivar and Mignolo, the discourse of U.S. imperialism had depended upon an archival apparatus that the field of American Studies legitimated and that "Inter-American Studies" reproduced. The apparatus, which was comprised of a relay of mutually constitutive terms, recognizable signs, metaphors, and master narratives preexisted cultural contact and permitted of the reallocation of these categories onto other cultures. With this apparatus as warrant, Saldivar and Mignolo warned that comparativist models might simply translate what Radway called "intricate interdependency" into the pre-existing identity categories mandated by inter-American Studies.

Whereas americanist scholars from the southern hemisphere castigated U.S. based models of Inter-American Studies for their reduction of the contradictory aspects of disjunctive cultures to a U.S. nationalist mode of understanding, Winfried Fluck, the Chair of American Culture at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies of the Free University of Berlin, criticized the hemispheric focus of Inter-American Studies for its tacit recovery of an exceptionalist paradigm and for its exclusion of transatlantic perspectives.. In an article entitled "Internationalizing American Studies: Do We Need an International American Studies Association and What Should Be its Goals?" which he published in the European Journal of American Culture, Fluck remarked that "an association that redefines the object of study as a hemispheric system risks losing the rationale for the existence of American Studies, the specific relevance of the United States as a paradigm-setting modern society." 5.

"International Studies of the United States" fared even less well than "Inter-American Studies." International scholars denounced in particular Radway's celebration of the coordination of knowledges across national borders as an extremely misleading account of how knowledge about "America" was produced, authorized and circulated either within or beyond United States' borders. "The reterritorialization of American Studies", as Liam Kennedy has cannily described this uneven mode of knowledge production "is not yet commensurate with the deterritorialization of America as an object of knowledge." 6.

In "Dislocating American Studies", Kennedy outlined an alternative explanatory model of Postnational America Studies which was unlike Radway's in that it would begin with a scrupulous analysis of the ways in which U.S. culture gets generated in other cultural contexts and that simply could not be recuperated in U.S. americanist terms. Rather than looking for similarities, Kennedy recommended that americanists trained in U.S. universities turn their experience of cross-cultural understandings of American Studies into the occasion to enter the otherwise occulted zone in between their established field identities and the processes of disidentification such encounters would invariably materialize. In reimagining themselves as Irish (or German or British or Spanish or Mexican or African or Indian) Americanists saw them, U.S. americanists would be required to decenter their scholarly identities so as to understand "American" things from a truly inter-national perspective.

In her office as the Chair of the International Committee of American Studies Association, Maureen Montgomery elaborated upon the inequality in the relations of knowledge production in the following comments which she addressed to the committee at the 1998 Seattle Conference of the American Studies Association:

The internationalization of American Studies has had a somewhat stunted growth The flow of ideas has been, for the most part, one way only-radiating out from the United States. US-based scholars and their scholarship dominate the field and cross-cultural studies have mostly been the province of americanists outside the US. There are few links between americanists from different countries outside the US-The US functions as the center of activity, the axis of the enterprise known as American Studies. 7.

In an article which was published in the 1998 volume of American Quarterly and entitled "Nationalist Postnationalism" Frederick Buell constructed what might be described as a dialectical synthesis of these disparate positions when he argued that the debate over postnationalism was itself productive of a new cultural nationalism. If one consequence of the global reorganization of the world economy was the emergence of new oppositional movements, another, Buell contended, was the transfiguration of US cultural nationalism into a postnational form. As the global became a mainstream cultural discourse, it dissolved those overt debates concerning the threats to the nation's foundations posed by multculturalism and the new ethnicities-and it materialized a site for conjoining nationalism with postnationalism in order to produce a national culture that would service postnationalist circumstances. "By the time of President Clinton's 1992 campaign", Buell remarked apropos of the architect of this political mutation, "the phrase the global economy had entered mainstream conversation. After which the term global meant less the nightmare that haunted Americans than a term to conjure with--the key term for restructuring the political discourse of national crisis and internal division into a new kind of recovery narrative, one that seemed to bend conservative nationalist and radical postnationalist positions into a new kind of nationalism for a global era." 8.

Perhaps it was because Radway had aspired to reinstitute the American Studies Association outside a nationalist denominative that her presidential address communicated the crisis of the nation-state that it also described. Raising the question of its name had evoked future directions for the organization, but it also threatened to divest the American Studies Association of its fundamental presuppositions. When she refused to reiterate the foundational statements correlating the scholarly prerogatives of the American Studies Association with the formative values of U.S. society, Radway had delegitimated one of the consensual fictions that had previously organized the American Studies community, and she had put into operation a conceptual machinery which was capable of dissolving the membership's ideological ties to the previously constituted association. The powerful emotional investments of desire and of fear that it elicited among U.S. americanists in particular turned her address into a site in which questions of patriotic belonging were subsequently played out.

The U.S. americanists who shared Radway's commitment to thinking beyond inherited models of sovereignty and nationalism, cited John Carlos Rowe's work on Postnational American Studies in which he represented the postnational orientation of the field as the means whereby americanist scholarship had been coordinated internationally. 9. But the U.S. americanist scholars who reacted most vociferously to the address had associated the crisis in affiliation which Radway's talk effected with anxieties over national belonging. These scholars responded to Radway's postnational imperatives with expressions of fear and outrage. They found these sentiments, which were anchored in their belief in the centrality of American Studies to the formation of U.S. citizens, authorized and elaborated upon in Arthur Schlesinger's ultra-nationalist fantasies that characterized advocates of postnationalism as political subversives.

Schlesinger's inability to tolerate difference was particularly evident in the rhetoric he deployed in The Disuniting of America, an ideological tract which represented multiculturalism and the politics of difference as indicative of disloyalty to the nation's foundational beliefs. 10. Schlesinger grounded this rhetoric in his belief that American Studies should inculcate a civic americanness that was capable of regulating cultural differences through their assimilation within a common patriotic culture. When evaluated in terms of Schlesinger's understanding of the field's role, Postnational American Studies would appear to have reneged on its patriotic duties.

The intensely felt yet contradictory responses to its effects which we have considered thus far provide ample evidence that the term "postnational" is ideological in the Gramscian sense that it is an essentially contested category. Because globalization goes above the nation-state and goes below it at the same time, the postnational might be described at once what has come after but also as what has established a kind of resistance to U.S. nationalism. The fact that the postnational orientation of the field has underwritten very different ideologies and political practices would indicate that the field of American Studies has itself become a site of hegemonic struggle.

Postnational America Studies, as we might summarize these observations concerning its effects, describes an inter-disciplinary formation that would change the epistemological objects and introduce an alternative politics of power and knowledge for the field. But the postnational does not operate on its own; it is a construction that is internally differentiated out of its intersection with other unfolding relations. If the globe has become a vast interlocking system for the production, accumulation, and distribution of capital, the nation-state can no longer function as the operative category either for the regulation or the disruption of these processes. When construed as participating in more pervasive struggles over the future dispensation of the global economy, Postnational American Studies can serve the interests of corporatist elites as the progenitor of a resurgent neoliberal politics of consensus. But it can also animate the subnational grassroots organizations mounted in opposition to these forces. The politics of Postnational American Studies would describe a contest between on the one hand the postnational state that serves the transnational corporations and facilitates its needs for exploitable labor and on the other hand the transnational social movements and subnational collective practices that seek to reorganize gendered and racialized capitalist relations around more equitable social and economic standards.

Because they are informed by profoundly different political and theoretical commitments and levels of analysis, I want to track briefly one of the ideological struggles that I believe to have become defining. The struggle to which I refer is evident in the fact that tropes of postnationalism inhabit the global imaginary constructed by the ideologues of global capital as well as the left political movements mounted in opposition to its spread; they inform the projects that would facilitate globalization from above and the grassroots organizations which would resist such incursions.

Contemporaneous with Radway's call for a deconstruction of the field's territorial borders, the image of a borderless world was also being effectively circulated by ideologues of global capital in places like Harvard and Stanford. Business school intellectuals also were intent upon building powerful postnational imaginaries of a global economy which was no longer divided into nation-states but was defined by border crossing flows of capital, information and people. Kenichi Ohmae in his 1995 article for the Harvard Business Review "Putting Global Logic to Work" argued that because they combine things at the wrong level of aggregation, nation-states have become inadequate repositories for the accumulation of capital. "Nation-states are eroding as economic actors…Region-states are taking shape. It is not a question of maybe or perhaps. It is happening." 11.

Noting that certain kinds of postnationalism arise out of the circuits of imperialist capital itself and that the line between the internationalism of the Left and the globalism of capitalist circuits must always be demarcated as rigorously as possible, Noam Chomsky has delineated the following two possible orientations for the postnational. "What's happening in Europe seems to me to be an evolution beyond the nation-state but in two different and even opposed directions-which one wins will be of great consequence. One is towards centralization of power in a transnational executive authority which is essentially immune from popular influence because nobody knows what's going on there. These quasi-governmental institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, the G-7, GATT and so on reflect the interests of transnational capital. If they have executive authority, free from the influence of parliamentary institutions, that is extremely dangerous in my opinion. On the other hand, you have the opposite development toward some kind of devolution and regional autonomy." 12.

When it is articulated to the conceptual needs of global relationships caused by shifts in the world economy, the term "postnational" describes the effect on the nation-state of the new global economic order which no longer finds in it a vehicle appropriate for the accumulation of capital or the regulation of labor. But when it describes the translocal solidarities of Transnational Advocacy Networks like Oxfam, or Amnesty International, or of the international projects of feminism and the Green Party, which lie outside and work across territorial borders, the postnational signifies processes which keep globalization in check even as they simultaneously produce a very different sense of it. The one model demonstrates how a single heterogenizing system tightens its grip on the most distant of global backwaters; the other model brings a more complex system into view that is at once decentered and interactive. The former depends on transnational capitalism and the global economy, the latter on peoplehood and imagined diasporic communities.

The difference between the "postnational" of the international left and the "postnational" of the international business class depends upon where the "post" in the postnational comes from and through which conceptual relays the postnational gets transmitted. The temporal dimension of the postnational sits in uneasy tension with a critical dimension that would activate a process of disengagement from the whole nationalist syndrome. This latter aspect comes into existence through a critique of the nationalist hegemony.

The tension between its temporal and critical aspects results in ambivalent significations for the postnational that become discernible in the following series of questions: Does the post in the postnational describe a definitive epistemological rupture or does it indicate a chronological divergence? Is the concept intended to be critical of or complicitous with the consecration of the globalist hegemony? Is the postnational the time after nationalism or is it a different way of experiencing nationalism? And what are the implications of the postnational for contemporary geopolitics and the politics of subject formation?

In a series of important essays that he recently published, Masao Miyoshi has criticized postnationalist discourse for its involvement in a silent partnership with the Transnational Corporations responsible for globalizing capitalism.13. Unlike its predecessor which produced citizen-subjects for the state, Postnational American Studies would transform citizens into a transnational elite of corporate managers that would acquiesce to the conditions of the global economy rather than formulate models of resistance to them.

But while Miyoshi's criticism would render the relationship between globalization and postnationalist initiatives transparently intelligible, it is not clear to me that their preference for settled political binaries can stabilize the political antagonisms at work in Postnational American Studies, which, as was discernible from the contradictory reactions to President Radway's inaugural address, is not a field from which it would be politically expedient or even possible to remove the qualities of complexity and ambiguity.

If the politics of Postnational American Studies concerns the different ways of staging the encounter between the historical nation and its internal and external others, it follows that the term postnational is not merely descriptive of a process of historical succession. When the postnational reads nationalization as part of an essentially transnational and transcultural process, its value lies precisely in its repudiation of the us against them, here rather than there, at home and abroad dualisms through which the discourse of nationalism had become hegemonic.

The hegemonic discourse of nationalism was composed out of the intertwined logics of developmental history and core-periphery topology. These logics produced the matrix for a global disposition of power which universal history mapped onto the teleological narratives out of which euroamerican nationalisms obtained their legitimating self-evidence. But such representations of nationalism as the end toward which "archaic" social formations tended substantially reduced the heterogeneous varieties and contexts of nationalism to the dimensions of an overarching evolutionary paradigm. This binaristic model set the "atavistic" traditions of peoples represented as without history in opposition to "modernist" discourses which established the master terms through which historical progress could be calculated. 14.

But the conception of progress which informed end-directed historicism had displaced forms of history written by the colonial victims of euroamerican nationalism. Cognitively degraded as its residua, these subaltern histories were construed as unassimilable to the historicisms which culminated in exclusivizing history. In writing the histories that globalization from above had excluded from the archive, these subaltern accounts reactivated the structures of difference that exclusivist models had sought to suppress and thereby challenged the colonial powers that derived their authority from these founding myths. It was precisely because they recorded grassroots experiences of globalization that took place outside a nationalist matrix that subaltern accounts of coloniality proved capable of discrediting the evolutionary model through which universal history represented global events.

Subaltern accounts of the various forms of colonial domination--from the Portuguese entry into the Indian Ocean and the British and Spanish and French conquest of the New World to the U.S. internationalization of financial markets and information flow--drastically ruptured the progressivist assumptions of the euroamerican narratives which had consigned colonialism to a marginal role in universal history. As the repository of unofficial historical knowledges this alternative archive has supplied the resources for the production of a materialist historiography that has brushed the universal history of nations against its progressivist grain and has introduced a different order of relations between global processes and the peoples they affected. This radical historiography has reconfigured historical spatiality along global axes of power rather than time and in doing so it has also transformed the geography of knowledge which was inscribed on the cognitive map underpinning eurocentric power. Despite their having been consigned to the realm of historical contingency, these radical historiographies have nevertheless continued to exert a retroactive temporal force capable of interrupting and calling into question every one of the past and present triumphs of the progressive national history.

In "When Was the Postcolonial?" Stuart Hall has drawn upon this alternative archive to articulate a postcolonial rephrasing of the genealogy of postnationalism. Hall describes "colonization as part of an essentially transnational and transcultural global process (which) produces a decentered, diasporic, or 'global' rewriting of nation-centered, imperial grand narratives." 15. This account leads Hall to criticize the settled binarisms (of the core and the periphery, of then and now, of domination and resistance) inscribed within nationalist historiographies as inadequate descriptions of the complex and multiply constituted identities resulting from the interplay of colonial power. (Post)colonial ways of living and of re-telling the story of globalization would replace the core-periphery paradigm with a model of the transverse relations of power that criss-cross the globe. This postnational model would explain how colonial relations produced identities which were always displaced and decentered by linkages between and across national frontiers and by localizations of global processes that would have remained unintelligible if read against a nation-state template. It is after the postnational discourse is relayed in terms of these postcolonial periodizations that Postnational American Studies can become attuned to the needs of those global communities which are economically and culturally at risk from globalization from above.

When expressed in terms of these postcolonial periodizations, the postnational can renarrativize and displace the story of capitalist modernity from its European center to its global peripheries. It is precisely because of this critical relay through the postcolonial periodization of globalization that the category of the postnational can become so sensitively attuned to precisely those dimensions-questions of hybridity, syncretism, of cultural undecidabilty and the complexities of diasporic identification--which interrupt any return to ethnically closed and centered origin histories.

Thus far, I have moved from a discussion of the postnational space Janice Radway opened up within the field of American Studies to a highly attenuated discussion of the war of positions that postnational space operationalized. But I cannot conclude this discussion without observing that when the field of Postnational American Studies intersects with international projects confronting the needs of immigrants and political refugees, this conjuncture should lead americanists to produce links between their research and the transnational networks that advocate on behalf of the victims of globalization.

Social theorists of the international standing of Jurgen Habermas and Arjun Appadurai have underscored the importance of thinking postnationally at this historical moment. But it is difficult to square Habermas's belief that enlightenment universalisms can meet this challenge with Appadurai's commitment to diasporic pluralisms. The postnational identity Habermas recommends might have confronted few difficulties in a postwar Germany where the memory of the Holocaust elevated the need to question national traditions into a quasi-patriotic duty. But constitutional patriotism fails to exert imaginative purchase on the consciousness of the Haitian refugees in Miami or on that of the Nicaraguan laborers in Tucson for whom the collective experience of historical discontinuity continues to evoke traumatic memories. 16

Members of diasporic communities are not necessarily attached to any national territory but are part of a delocalized transnation composed of deterritorialized and extraterritorial peoples who may (or may not) remain loyal to their nations of origin, but who are ambivalent about their loyalties to the United States. If americanness is to change its meaning, as "What's in a Name" has suggested that it must, the power of americanization to transcend and contain cultural differences will have to be challenged. Americanists committed to this collective effort will be required to imagine patterns of everyday sociability and bonds of solidarity within and across communities that do not ratify national models. The absence of any organizing framework other than nationalism to define these groups' translocal solidarities is perhaps more revelatory of the impoverishment of the postnational imagination than the hegemony of territorial nationalisms.

Arjun Appadurai has called for imaginative projects that would enable such groups to renegotiate their links to diasporic networks and which would enable them to replace patriotic loyalties--no matter whether to a nation or to a constitution--with loyalty to a nonterritorial transnation. The incapacity of deterritorialized groups to think their way out of the images which the nation-state has authorized might itself explain much global violence. If cultural nationalists have only created new versions of what they had resisted in many of the new postcolonial nation-states, this vicious circle can only be broken, as Arjun Appadurai has observed, "when a postnational imaginary is forged that proves capable of capturing these complex nonterritorial postnational forms of allegiance." 17

Perhaps the invention of such an imaginary describes the central political task of Postnational American Studies.


Endnotes 

I wish to thank Liam Kennedy for having invited me to deliver the keynote lecture on "Postnational America Studies' at Birmingham University in February of 2001. A significantly revised version of this paper, which is drawn from that keynote lecture, will appear in the next issue of the European Journal of American Culture.

1. "'What's in a Name?'' Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, November 20, 1998, American Quarterly 51 (March, 1999):1-32. 

2. Radway, "What's in a Name?" :10. 

3. Jose David Saldivar, The Dialectics of Our America (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991). In "Does the Project of the Left have a Future?" boundary 2:24(1997) John Beverly has underscored the continued importance of the nation-state as a vehicle for expressing resistance to global inequities: "Who is in a better position to mediate between the local and the international power structures than the nation-state?", 47-48. 

4. Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality and Colonization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995) and Walter Mignolo, "Canons and Corpus: Alternative Views of Comparative Literature in Colonial Situations", Dedalus: Revista Portuguesa de Literatura Comparada, 1 (Fall 1992):219-44. For an elaboration of this critique, see Minoo Moallem and Iain A. Boal "Multicultural Nationalism and the Poetics of Inauguration" in Between Woman and Nation: Nationalisms, Transnational Feminisms and the State, edited by Caren Kaplan, Norma Alarcon, Minoo Moallem (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 243-263. 

5. Winfried Fluck, "Internationalizing American Studies: Do We Need an International American Studies Association and What Should Be its Goals" European Journal of American Culture, 19 , no. 3 (2000): 152. 

6. Liam Kennedy, "Dis-Locating American Studies: On Space, Place and Traveling Theory" (forthcoming). 

7. Maureen Montgomery, "Introduction: The Construction of an International American Studies Community", American Studies International XXXVII (June, 1999): 5. 

8. Frederick Buell "Nationalist Postnationalism: Globalist Discourse in Contemporary American Culture", American Quarterly 50 (September 1998): 553. 

9. See in particular, Postnational American Studies, ed. John Carlos Rowe (Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press, 2000). 

10. Arthur Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (New York: Norton, 1992). 

11. Kenichi Ohmae, "Putting Global Logic First," Harvard Business Review (January-February 1995):120 and122. But in "Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State", Linda Weiss has offered compelling theoretical reasons for refusing to accept this claim "rather than counterposing the nation-state and the global market as antinomies, in certain important respects we find that 'globalization' is often the byproduct of states promoting the internationalization strategies of their corporations". New Left Review (Sept/Oct 1997): 4. 

12. Noam Chomsky, "The Politics of Knowledge", in States of Mind: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers on the European Mind, ed. Richard Kearney (Manchester: University of Manchester Press 1995), 48-49. 

13. See in particular Masao Miyoshi, "A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State", Critical Inquiry 19 (Summer 1993): 221-243. 

14. David Lloyd has explained this dynamic with remarkable clarity in "Nationalism Against the State" in The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital, ed. David Lloyd and Lisa Lowe (Durham: Duke University Press 1997),173-197. 

15. Stuart Hall, "'When Was the Post-Colonial?' Thinking at the Limit", The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons, (Routledge : New York and London 1996),.242-260. 

16. Jurgen Habermas, "National Unification and Popular Sovereignty", New Left Review 219 (September/October 1994), 3-21. 

17. Arjun Appadurai, "Patriotism and Its Futures" in Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1998):166. For an excellent discussion of globalization from below, see Arjun Appadurai, "Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination", Public Culture 12 (Winter 2000):1-20. "But a series of social forms have emerged to contest, interrogate, and reverse these developments and to produce forms of knowledge transfer and social mobilization that proceed independently of the actions of corporate capital and the nation-state system (and its international affiliates and guarantors). These social forms rely on strategies, visions and horizons of globalization on behalf of the poor that can be characterized as 'grassroots globalization' or, put in a slightly different way as globalization from below."