

**Neoconservatives and the Dilemmas of Strategy and Ideology,
1992-2006***

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In all the discussions of neoconservative foreign policy that have taken place over the past couple of years --- some more informed than others, some more disapproving than others --- there is one abiding perception that seems to unite critics and proponents alike: that a neoconservative foreign policy is distinct from other strands of conservatism because of its emphasis on democracy promotion and that, in fact, exporting democracy for strategic and moral reasons --- and through hard power if necessary --- is one of the central defining purposes of contemporary second generation neoconservatism.

This paper will challenge the dominant view that neoconservatism prioritises democracy promotion. It will examine the nature of the neoconservative foreign policy strategy articulated during the 1990s --- which, it is argued, has been widely misinterpreted --- and will discuss the strategic and ideological tensions inherent within the strategy. Though the George W. Bush administration has not followed a neoconservative strategy in every respect, his administration has been strongly influenced by it and so some of these strategic and ideological tensions have also emerged since 9/11. It is my belief that the central cause of this tension is that the most important priority of the neoconservative strategy has always been to preserve the post-cold war 'unipolar moment' by perpetuating American pre-eminence and this clashes with the purported emphasis on democratization. The strategy also risks imperial overstretch and, for the most part, it fails to consider matters that are not state-based economic or state-based military issues.

At the end of the cold war, the first generation of neoconservatives that had emerged in the early seventies, was replaced by a second, younger generation that began to gravitate around the idea of American unipolarism.¹ (This is the group that will be the subject of our discussion here.) It is important to clarify from the beginning that although this younger group was organised and led primarily by neoconservatives such as William Kristol and Robert Kagan, it was not their exclusive domain; rather it was a mix of neocons and other conservatives, such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who all shared a vision of a unipolar America, a vision of global dominance. Gary Dorrien refers to this group collectively as “unipolarists”.² In the main, neocons were the most important organisers and theorists within this network, but their ideas enjoyed some wider support.³ How much of a difference there, in fact, is between neocons and their other conservative sympathisers is an issue we will return to.

“Benevolent Global Hegemony”

In terms of strategy, this group embraced the concept of unipolarism.⁴ At the end of the Cold War, American found itself, to use Charles Krauthammer’s famous phrase, in a “unipolar” position. It no longer had to accept the existence of a competing superpower, so rather than following a defensive strategy, like the one put forward by the first generation of neocons in the 70s, the US could now project power offensively to shape the world and construct an American imperium.⁵

This was captured in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance document, written for then Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, by staffers Zalmay Khalilzad and Lewis Libby, who worked for the undersecretary of defence, Paul Wolfowitz.⁶ In contrast to the first generation of neocons, they now had the freedom to develop a strategy that rejected coexistence with any rival power and actively sought to prevent the emergence of a new competitor. This was the essence of the neoconservative strategy that was built upon by their think tanks and advocacy groups during the nineties.

In preventing the emergence of a rival power, Washington would be constructing --- in the words of Kristol and Kagan ----a “benevolent global hegemony”.⁷ While this would not solve every problem in the world, American hegemony would be better than any conceivable alternative. Joshua Muravchik wrote in 1992 of “the soothing effect” of American power because it could maintain order in the world and reassure those feeling threatened by other states.⁸ Moreover, according to Kristol and Kagan, “most of the world’s major powers” “welcome...and prefer” American hegemony to any other alternative because they are much better off under Washington’s tutelage since it looks after their interests too⁹ and thus discourages them from seeking to challenge American power.

According to most of the neoconservatives, the “benevolence” of this “empire” --- to use Kagan’s words --- was assured by the fact that moral ideals and national interest almost always converge.¹⁰ What is good for American preponderance is, *de facto*, good both morally and strategically for most of the rest of the world too. As Wolfowitz wrote in Spring 2000: “Nothing could be less realistic than... the ‘realist’ view of foreign policy that dismisses human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy.”¹¹

“Exporting Democracy”? -- The Uses of Hard and Soft Power

There is a common belief that *neoconservatism* distinguishes itself from old conservatism by its core focus on democracy promotion. The second generation of neoconservatives have been described by Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey as “democratic imperialists”.¹² Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke have accused them of hijacking the Bush administration to promote a secret agenda of democratisation of the Middle East.¹³ Scholars including Steven Hurst, Murray Friedman, Inderjeet Parmar, Adam Wolfson and Mario Del Pero have all argued that neoconservatism is distinguished at least in part by an emphasis on democracy promotion.¹⁴ Because of the neoconservatives’ disproportionate use of rhetoric about democracy, there is a common misperception that their strategy revolves around exporting democracy through force if necessary and that

this was the real neoconservative goal in Iraq. However, if we examine what the neocons said about the promotion of democracy during the 1990s, it becomes clear that *if* ‘democracy’ was to be ‘exported’, it was almost always through soft power. As we shall see, most neoconservatives simply never discussed the idea of using hard power for the purpose of exporting democracy. Some explicitly ruled out invading other countries to bring democracy. This stance was best summed up by Muravchik who wrote in 1996 that “Rarely should force be used for values alone. It should be reserved for situations when our interests are at stake”.¹⁵ Michael Ledeen of the AEI wrote in his 1996 book, *Freedom Betrayed*, of the practical assistance that could be given to foreign dissidents, but stopped short of suggesting that the US should offer its own troops for the cause.¹⁶ Kristol and Kagan supported soft power initiatives including increased cultural exchanges, dissident radio stations and other practical assistance to dissidents --- occasionally even military assistance, depending on the circumstances --- but they never advocated using America’s own hard power for the purpose of democratising other countries.¹⁷ This complemented Kagan’s own earlier writings about

[t]he *prudent* support of democracy, using all the many tools at
[our] disposal, *most of them well short of military force....*

Democracy should not be promoted in an “uncompromising” fashion, “in every country in the world at all times regardless of the cost or risk”, Kagan stated, but pursued if and when conditions allowed it. (First italic in original, second added).¹⁸ Charles Krauthammer has stated more recently that the US should “support democracy everywhere but...commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity”, thus ruling out military interventions for anything other than strategic necessity.¹⁹

Although Kristol and Kagan qualified their comments by also stating that the exact criteria for intervention could not be known in advance, their record during the nineties -- and the record of the neoconservative-led network --- appears to bear out their unwillingness to use hard power to spread democracy. The Project for the New American

Century's (PNAC) public letter to President Clinton in 1998 that called for regime change in Iraq did not mention democracy or the internal nature of Saddam's regime (or, for that matter, terrorism), but focused instead on geopolitical issues including the safety of "a significant portion of the world's oil supply".²⁰ Even PNAC's letter to President Bush on 20th September 2001, which claimed to outline the "minimum necessary if th[e] war [on terror] is to be fought effectively and brought to a successful conclusion" did not mention the promotion of democracy in Iraq or anywhere else.²¹ In the case of Bosnia in 1995, most of the neocons and their sympathisers supported a 'lift and strike' policy, but they did not mention democratisation. Writing in *The Weekly Standard*, Robert Kagan summed up the neoconservative stance by framing the issue in terms of the credibility of American leadership in Europe²². Similarly, during the Kosovo crisis the central issue was, in the words of the *Standard's* editorial page, "revers[ing] the dangerous decline in American military power and international leadership".²³ Democracy promotion was notable only by its' virtual absence from a debate which revolved around preserving and extending American unipolarity. Within this, democracy was a secondary or even tertiary concern.

It is nevertheless true that the 2003 Iraq War was accompanied by a fusillade of rhetoric about humanitarianism and democracy promotion. However, this was merely retrospective justification. It was only after Hans Blix and his team of weapons inspectors were allowed into Iraq that the main rationale for war shifted from security grounds to humanitarian grounds.²⁴ If the real issue for the Bush administration was democratisation, then we would have heard references to this before the failure to find WMD; and similarly, if democratisation was the real issue for neoconservatives we would have seen references to it in their earlier writings before they were back in power.

For the neocons, then, hard power is principally to be used to shape the world in America's interest and perpetuate a preponderance of power. At this point, it is worth considering how unique neoconservatism actually is. The disproportionate rhetoric about democratisation has obscured the true place of democracy promotion in the neoconservative strategy. Rather than being the (or one of the) central defining

purpose(s), democratisation is on the whole only a soft power project which may, or may not depending on the circumstances, be one part of a strategy to preserve American unipolarity. There is in fact a much greater degree of convergence between neocons and other conservative unipolarists than has been appreciated by most commentators (such as Halper and Clarke, Daalder and Lindsey.) This is why the two groups have worked so well together in the Bush administration.

This is not to suggest, however, that there are no differences between them: soft power initiatives are more important to neocons; the rhetorical framing of policy is much more grandiose and ideological when it comes from neocons --- Kristol and Kagan argue that grounding policy in ideals cultivates long-term public support for an aggressive foreign policy²⁵; and there may be differences between neocons and other conservative unipolarists about which peripheral conflicts deserve attention.²⁶ Yet because of the degree of strategic convergence between these two conservative groups, their criteria for actual military intervention are effectively the same. Both consider whether vital strategic interests are at stake and if they are, then the US is compelled to intervene. In addition --- and in contrast to conservative realists --- unipolarists also ask whether there is a threat to the American-led world order. For both groups, the US national interest is global preponderance, which means preventing the rise of a rival power that could challenge the US-led world order (such as Iraq or Iran) and it means protecting the interests of friends and allies so that they do not need to consider challenging American leadership; for example in Kosovo, where the US sought to diffuse a conflict which destabilised S.E. Europe and was a major concern to the European powers (although, there may be some disagreement about which peripheral conflicts might pose a threat to the global order.)

The Tensions of Hegemony

There are four distinct tensions within the neoconservative strategy that emerge on a theoretical level and, to a certain extent, have also emerged during the Bush administration. Although Bush has not followed every policy advocated by the

neoconservative network, some of its most important policies have been influenced by them and so some of the tensions in their strategy are discernable in Bush's foreign policy too. We will look at examples from both.

1. Conflict between power and idealism:

A national interest defined as 'global hegemony' does not always converge with the ideal of democratic self-governance. It is revealing that, despite arguing that interests and ideals converge, neoconservatives still explicitly recognise the distinction between intervening to defend interests and intervening solely to promote ideals. Recognising this distinction is an implicit acknowledgment that interests and ideals do not always converge, that they cannot both always be promoted and that when a government must choose between the two, it should protect its interests.

The evidence suggests that the defining principle for neoconservatives is not whether a regime is democratic, but whether it challenges American pre-eminence. The neoconservative president of the Center for Security Policy, Frank Gaffney, has stated that the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela signals "the return of totalitarianism in Latin America", despite Chavez' three election victories. (Gaffney is more likely motivated by Chavez' pursuit of regional economic policies that defy the Washington consensus).²⁷ Similarly, Robert Kaplan, another proponent of American 'empire', argues that the democratically elected president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, is a threat to US interests: "in moral terms he is not a bad guy...but he is part of a leftist drift in Latin America that poses challenges to US interests."²⁸ Free elections across the Middle East and the anti-Washington governments that might result, would probably not be compatible with US dominance of the region either.²⁹ As Richard Perle and David Frum candidly state

It is not always in our power to do anything about [undemocratic governments], *nor is it always in our interest*, but when it is *in our power and our interest*, we should toss dictators aside...

For Perle and Frum, then, there are occasions when it is simply not in the US interest to challenge undemocratic governments. This is something that should only be done if it complements US interests, which neoconservatives define as the pursuit of American unipolarity.³⁰

2. *'Benevolent global hegemony' lacks requisite strategic depth:*

Just precluding the rise of a rival power does not deal with all threats because it does not account for transnational problems. In his book on soft power, Joseph Nye identifies three levels of power in international relations.³¹ The first is the military level, where the US is able to dominate; the second is the economic level, where power is more multipolar, spread amongst the western powers; and the third is the transnational level, where power is more chaotically dispersed because no single state can deal alone with issues such as climate change, infectious diseases, international crime, terrorism. The neoconservative strategy caters to the first and second levels of international relations, but not the third. The parameters are essentially drawn around state-based economic and military issues, thus precluding full and frank discussion of issues that fall outside of those parameters. Since America's unipolar position was achieved by focusing on traditional military, political and economic matters, issues that fall outside of those boundaries are not perceived as a threat to it.

The neoconservative response to such issues tends to be two-fold: the issue is either ignored completely (a search of *The Weekly Standard's* archive of eleven years finds just one article on climate change); or it is forced to fit their favoured strategic paradigm: so terrorism is interpreted as a 'state-sponsored' phenomenon by countries such as Iraq and North Korea. Perle and Frum, for instance, claim that "because terrorism is difficult, terrorists almost always require some kind of support from a government somewhere."³² Kaplan has argued that the greatest threat the United States faces is the prospect of "a

paranoid and resentful state leader” --- in a country such as Russian, North Korea, Venezuela or Iran --- who was “willing to make strategic use of stateless terrorists.”³³

This tension has been evident in the policies of the Bush administration too. Its’ new 2006 National Security Strategy, argues that the key to global security is transformational change at state level and that in the world today, what really matters is “*the fundamental character of regimes*”.³⁴ In contrast, there are only three lines about environmental issues and three on global pandemics, both in the last chapter. There is no clear recognition that climate change is induced by human behaviour.³⁵

3. *Backlash against ‘hegemony’:*

It is self-evident that not all countries welcome American leadership and therefore it is not always a stabilising factor. When other countries have aims or interests that are incompatible with US policy, they develop strategies of opposition.³⁶ Iran is insisting on its right to develop nuclear power, despite (or perhaps because of) US opposition. In Venezuela and Bolivia, democratically elected indigenous leaders are challenging the US-led regional economic and political order.³⁷ In Iraq, the ferocity and longevity of the insurgency has probably surprised even opponents of the war.³⁸ Neoconservatism offers no strategy to deal with these challenges other than ploughing on with the same policies that produced the backlash in the first place: projecting power and pursuing “hegemony” and hoping that those recalcitrant states will come to understand the benefits of being on Washington’s side in the global power game, rather than trying to challenge it; that they have more to lose by opposing the US than by joining it.³⁹ History suggests that not all states will acquiesce to American preponderance, though, and so if the US is prevent their emergence as potential rival powers --- whether regional or global --- it may reach a point where the only option left would be to consider multiple regime changes, which --- even if pursued through measures short of war --- would be a task so broad in scope as to become, in the words of Walter Lippmann, a “strategic monstrosity”.⁴⁰

4. *Imperial Overstretch:*

In an interview with the BBC in early 2003, Ledeen announced a list of governments that were the first targets for regime change: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia were the “big four” but “then there’s Libya. There’s a North Korean problem too that we’ll have to deal with...”⁴¹ The first generation of neoconservatives in the 1970s were much more cognizant of the limits on American power, recognising that it was not possible for the US to attack the Soviet Union or even to intervene in every case of communist expansion on the periphery. In contrast, the second generation is much less aware of the limits on US power and so its strategy is much more susceptible to overstretch. “Benevolent global hegemony” is simply too ambitious an objective because the US does not have the resources to sustain the type of dominance envisioned by the neocons. It would require not only the normalisation of regime change as a policy option --- in at least four countries, according to Ledeen --- but also overcoming the more serious challenges to American power provoked by that dominance. Moreover, the second generation of neocons (unlike the first) has an aversion to deficit spending. Unless domestic programmes were subject to substantial cuts --- which may not prove popular with the electorate --- then neocons would have to overcome their own objections to federal deficits.⁴²

In addition, the resources required are not just financial. Public support for a long-term aggressive and interventionist foreign policy is indispensable, as Kristol and Kagan acknowledge;⁴³ but in a June 2006 NBC/*Wall Street Journal* poll, 53 percent said the decision to attack Iraq was wrong and 57 percent believed US troops should be reduced.⁴⁴ The same month, Bush’s job approval rating hovered between just 39 and 41 percent.⁴⁵ Perhaps there is some tacit recognition of this developing in the Bush administration since it recently introduced the concept of “transformational diplomacy”, which appears to acknowledge that not all problems can be solved through military means.⁴⁶

In any case, while the US may remain the preponderant power by default for the foreseeable future, the emergence of China may eventually mean that the neocons and future administrations simply have to accept some form of coexistence with a rival power in the long term. This would be comparable to the way in which the first generation of neoconservatives were forced to accept a countervailing superpower in the form of the Soviet Union.

Some Brief Conclusions

There are serious strategic and ideological tensions that occur within neoconservative global strategy --- and also within the foreign policy of the Bush administration --- because a neoconservative foreign policy is designed to give justification to an American preponderance of power above all. It is not a flexible strategy that can deal with new transnational issues as they emerge, because these issues would divert funds and resources from the neoconservatives' preferred global strategy, the cornerstone of which is not democratisation, but the preservation of American pre-eminence.

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¹ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke refer to the notion of a "generational hand-off" from the first generation of neocons who had been politically active in the sixties and seventies and, in some cases, employed in the Reagan administration, to the second, younger generation that was in the ascendancy during the 1990s. See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke *America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004): 98-103.

² Gary Dorrien *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana* (Routledge, New York/London 2004): 1-6

³ For a perfect example, see the Statement of Principles by the Project for the New American Century (hereafter PNAC), 3rd June 1997, URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm> The Project was established by William Kristol and Robert Kagan --- both self-identified neoconservatives --- but its founding statement includes signatories such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld who are not neocons but still share a vision of a unipolar America.

⁴ The phrase “unipolar moment” originates from neoconservative commentator, Charles Krauthammer. See his article ‘The Unipolar Moment’ *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/1991: 22-33.

⁵ On the defensive strategy of the first generation of neocons, see Maria Ryan ‘Neoconservative Intellectuals and the Limitations of Governing: The Reagan Administration and the Demise of the Cold War’ *Comparative American Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4, forthcoming December 2006: manuscript in author’s possession.

⁶ For online extracts of the Defense Planning Guidance see URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html> For more extensive excerpts see ‘Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: “Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival”’ *New York Times* (henceforth *NYT*), March 8 1992.

⁷ William Kristol and Robert Kagan ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’ *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No.4: 18-32

⁸ Joshua Muravchik ‘Losing the Peace’ *Commentary* July 1992, Vol. 94, No. 1: 42.

⁹ Kristol and Kagan ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’

¹⁰ Robert Kagan, ‘The Benevolent Empire’ *Foreign Policy*, No. 111, Summer 1998: 24-35. On the convergence of interest and ideals, see Kristol and Kagan, ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’; Joshua Muravchik, interview with the author, 3rd February 2006; Peter Rodman *More Precious Than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World* (Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York 1994): 527-48; Robert Kagan ‘American Power--A Guide for the Perplexed’ *Commentary*, April 1996, Vol. 101, No. 4: 21-31; Paul Wolfowitz, ‘Remembering the Future’ *The National Interest*, Spring 2000, reproduced at URL (consulted July 2006): http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2000_Spring/ai_61299040

¹¹ Wolfowitz, ‘Remembering the Future’;

¹² Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC 2003): 15

¹³ Halper and Clarke *America Alone*: 17-18, 139.

¹⁴ Steven Hurst, ‘Myths of Neoconservatism: George W. Bush’s “Neo-conservative” Foreign Policy Revisited’, *International Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 1, March 2005:75-96. Murray Friedman, *The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005): 223-42. Inderjeet Parmar, ‘Catalysing Events, Think Tanks and American Foreign Policy: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Pearl Harbor and September 11th 2001’ *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 40 No. 1, Winter 2005: 1-25. Mario Del Pero, ‘A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom: The Historical and Ideological Roots of the Neoconservative Persuasion’, EUI Working Paper for the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Transatlantic Programme Series, URL (consulted July 2006): http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/3371/1/05_22.pdf Adam Wolfson, ‘Conservatives and Neoconservatives’ in Irwin Stelzer (ed.) *The Neocon Reader*(Grove Press New York, 2004): 227-8

¹⁵ Joshua Muravchik, *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism* (Washington, AEI Press, 1996): 163

¹⁶ Michael Ledeen, *Freedom Betrayed: How America Led a Global Democratic Revolution, Won the Cold War and Walked Away* (Washington, AEI Press, 1996): 146-50

¹⁷ William Kristol and Robert Kagan, 'National Interest and Global Responsibility' in Robert Kagan and William Kristol (eds.) *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (Encounter Books, San Francisco 2000): 12-14

¹⁸ Robert Kagan 'Books in Review -- Global Democracy: "Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny" by Joshua Muravchik' *Commentary*, Vol. 92 No. 2, August 1991: 56

¹⁹ Charles Krauthammer, 'Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World', speech given to the American Enterprise Institute, February 10th 2004, URL (consulted July 2006): http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=19912

²⁰ Project for the New American Century, letter to President Clinton on Iraq, January 26th 1998, URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm>

²¹ Project for the New American Century, Letter to President Bush on Iraq, 20th September 2001, URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm>

²² Robert Kagan, 'American, Bosnia, Europe: A Compelling Interest' *The Weekly Standard* 6th November 1995: 27-9

²³ 'Editorial: 'Foreign Policy and the Republican Future (II)', *The Weekly Standard*, 12th October 1998: 8

²⁴ On the timing of the change of rationale, see Noam Chomsky *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (Metropolitan Books, New York 2006): 102-65

²⁵ William Kristol and Robert Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy' *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996, reproduced at URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.ceip.org/people/kagfaff.htm>

²⁶ Compare for example, the PNAC Statement of Principles, which states overall objectives at URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm> whose signatories include Cheney and Rumsfeld, with the PNAC letter to Clinton on regime change in Kosovo at URL (consulted July 2006): http://www.newamericancentury.org/balkans_pdf_04.pdf which they did not sign.

²⁷ See extracts from *War Footing: 10 Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the War for the Free World* at URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.warfooting.com/> with extracts about Latin America at <http://www.warfooting.com/LookInside/PageID.9/default.asp>

²⁸ Robert D. Kaplan 'Old States, New Threats', *Washington Post* (henceforth *WP*), April 23rd 2006. On Kaplan's politics, see Andrew Bacevich, 'Robert Kaplan: Empire Without Apologies', *The Nation*, 26th September 2005, URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050926/bacevich>

²⁹ See F. Gregory Gause III 'Can Democracy Stop Terrorism'? *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005, Vol. 84, No. 5: 62-76.

³⁰ Emphasis added. Richard Perle and David Frum *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (Random House New York, 2004): 113-4.

³¹ Joseph Nye *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Public Affairs, New York 2004): 1-5

³² Perle and Frum, *An End to Evil*: 231

³³ Kaplan, 'Old States, New Threats'

³⁴ ‘Overview of America’s National Security Strategy’ in *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (henceforth *NSS*), March 2006, URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionI.html>

³⁵ Chapter X, ‘Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization’ *NSS*, URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionX.html> Note that Chapter IV of the *NSS* discusses the impact of dwindling oil supplies but from an economic, not environmental, perspective: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionVI.html>

³⁶ See Stephen Walt, ‘Taming American Power’, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005, Vol. 84, No. 5: 105-120

³⁷ ‘Oil Companies Not Entitled to Payment, Bolivian Says’, *NYT*, 12th May 2006. ‘US Aid Can’t Win Bolivia’s Love as New Suitor Emerges’, *NYT*, 14th May 2006. ‘Unnatural Disaster’, *Los Angeles Times*, 6th May 2006. Text of Peoples Trade Agreement between Cuba, Bolivia and Venezuela, signed April 2006 at URL (consulted July 2006): <http://quest.quixote.org/node/305>. Latin America prepares to “say no to Bush”, *Guardian*, 4th Nov 2005. ‘Rioters shatter Bush’s hopes of forging free trade coup’, *Observer*, 6th Nov. 2005

³⁸ In early 2005, the National Intelligence Council released a report stating that Iraq had replaced Afghanistan as the training ground for the next generation of “professionalized” terrorists. ‘Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground: War Created Haven, CIA Advisors Report’, *WP*, 14 Jan 2005.

³⁹ For example, in January 2005, PNAC sent a letter to Congress calling for an expansion of the US military because “it is too small for the responsibilities we are asking it to assume”. See ‘Letter to Congress on Increasing US Ground Forces’, 28th January 2005, URL (consulted July 2006): <http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20050128.htm> In addition, Kagan has written many times about the importance of setting an example of American strength for potential challengers. See for example, ‘The Case for Global Activism’, *Commentary*, November 1994, Vol. 98, No. 3: 43.

⁴⁰ Commenting in 1947, Lippmann was of course referring to the policy of containment.

⁴¹ ‘The War Party’, BBC *Panorama* transcript, may 18th 2003, cited in Halper and Clarke *America Alone*: 102

⁴² Irwin Stelzer, ‘Neoconservatives and Their Critics’ in Stelzer (ed.) *The Neocons Reader*: 25

⁴³ See footnote 24

⁴⁴ ‘Bush Sees Progress but Not “Zero Violence” In Iraq’, *NYT* (Reuters), 14th June 2006

⁴⁵ Rasmussen Reports: George W. Bush Job Approval Rating, URL (consulted June 2006): http://www.rasmussenreports.com/Bush_Job_Approval.htm

⁴⁶ ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, Speech by Secretary Condoleeza Rice, Georgetown University, Washington DC, January 18th 2006, URL, (consulted July 2006): <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>